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JANUARY 1988

A SOVIET WEEKLY
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

NEW TIMES

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

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OF THOSE WHO DO NOT WANT DISARMAMENT

WORLD CULTURE: INDIVISIBLE HERITAGE

Drawing by Mikhail Zlatkovsky

NEW TIMES

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DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS



Debates on ratification of the INF treaty have begun in the Soviet parliament and the U.S. Senate. Meanwhile the NATO headquarters is considering a compensation for the American missiles to be scrapped. West European politicians and military experts discuss what kind of defence Europe needs. See p.5.

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

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Cover by
Jerzy Kolacz

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REPERCUSSIONS OF THE SUMMIT

Common sense has prevailed

I think not only Soviet people but all peoples on earth are still impressed by the results of Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the United States. Common sense has finally prevailed. We hoped the leaders of the two countries would be able to reach agreement, and that this long-awaited day would come sooner or later.

A. KUCHERYAYEVA
Krasnoyarsk Territory, U.S.S.R.

Anxiety remains

So the agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. has been signed, but anxiety persists. There is strong opposition to the treaty.

The question also remains as to why other states with nuclear weapons are in no hurry to join in the talks on disarmament. Even if the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. destroy their nuclear arsenals, other countries would still be able to use such weapons.

L. IVANOVA
Krivoi Rog, U.S.S.R.

THE WAY I SEE IT

No statute of limitations

From A. Makovsky's article "Case No. 10-2-024-87" I learnt that the government of Great Britain is giving refuge to traitors from the Ukrainian division Galitsia, who during the war collaborated with the fascists. All nazi criminals should be punished! I'd like to know how Britain would react if the Soviet Union had given refuge to her citizen who had murdered hundreds of Britons. I can well imagine the hullabaloo! The insults hurled at the Soviet Union!

I. STOLYAROV
Odessa, U.S.S.R.

Who breaks up families

The problem of "reuniting families" is discussed in great detail in the West. It is said that the Soviet Union puts up obstacles to this. The question arises of what countries are disuniting families today.

It is imperialism that compels millions of foreign workers to move from one continent to another, from one country to another; it is the United States that is responsible for the brain drain from developing countries. The practice of the inhuman disuniting of families should be stigmatized.

Dr WERNER DOHRMANN
Bernburg-Strenzfeld, G.D.R.

OPINIONS

Socialism will not be smeared

I wholly share Comrade Gorbachev's assessment of Stalin in the report on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the October revolution. In the past I have read the documents from the 20th and the 22nd congresses of the CPSU and realized what a tragedy the Soviet people has lived through and what a price it paid for the construction of socialism. But I have noticed how quick conservative forces in the U.S. and the countries allied with it are to take advantage of this just criticism. They have been prompt in their attempts to smear a whole period in your history. But we real Communists believe that imperfect socialism is better than the "best" kind of capitalism.

VINCENZO SENIA
Rome, Italy

Let's seek what unites us

I am convinced that with all the fundamental differences between our system and the capitalist one, there is no need to look for pretexts to discredit and humiliate the other side. Let us not just put up with each other as one might with a toothache, but look for the common things that can enrich us all. This is what the new political thinking is all about.

J. BIEZAIS
Kekava, U.S.S.R.

Perestroika must go on

I welcome the changes that are taking place in your country. The restructuring of the Soviet economy is so greatly needed that everything should be done to make it bear fruit as soon as possible. Let the acceleration take its toll in temporary inconvenience, and at times even put some of the population to the test.

ENRICO ZANNI
Modena, Italy

GLASNOST

FROM OUR MAILBAG

POLEMICS

I am against "dual power"

I should like to continue the discussion on the feasibility of open elections to the leadership of work collective council (WCC) begun by Professor Torkanovsky (No. 2/88). One aspect of the problem is the WCC's relations with the administration. The council has the right to decide, or put before a meeting of the work force, almost all important issues in economic and social life, including wages, bonuses, norms and working conditions, and appointments to managerial posts.

Naturally a body with such rights is not simply one more addition to the bodies repeatedly set up and then forgotten. One further point - wouldn't such a body with extensive rights lead to "dual power," with the administration having full rights on one side and, on the other, the council representing the work force which, under the Law on the State Enterprise, is its master?

In principle, the problem of distinguishing between the powers of the two is simply resolved: it should be the administration's prerogative to carry out the council's decisions on strategic long-term economic issues. But at the stage of drafting them, there should be the widest democracy and full scope for initiative. When it comes to implementing them there should be strict discipline, with the administration enjoying the widest powers. The council should retain its powers of control so that the management can consistently put into effect the decisions taken by the collective.

The work of such self-governing bodies at those few enterprises where they have been functioning for some time, some of them in other socialist countries, shows that clashes between the council and the administration are a rare exception if there is mutual control and mutual responsibility, and if the party organization has sufficient ideological and organizational prestige to prevent conflicts arising.

A. BUZGALIN
Cand.Sc. (Econ.)
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

OUR READERS ASK...

...about Vavilov and Lysenko

We foreign readers do not always understand the facts in some of your articles. Take the item "Life is short..."(issue No. 49, 1987). Who was Nikolai Vavilov? And who was Lysenko? The article fails to give details of Vavilov's life, nor does it carry concrete information about his achievements. How did he die? We would like to have the answers to these questions. In general, we look to New Times for advice, and at the same time regard it as a work of reference.

EWALD and INGE PRACEUS
Berlin, G.D.R.

...about perestroika

People are tired of the twaddle of the past, and so our present chief undertaking - perestroika, which I wholeheartedly support - is distrusted by some. They are afraid it might be just another campaign. The success of perestroika should be judged by actions and end results, and it is also the responsibility of journalists to set such priorities....

V. NAUMOV
Ivano-Frankovsk Region, U.S.S.R.

...about self-government

Today we talk a lot about self-governing bodies, although recently this concept rarely appeared in our press. As far as I know, self-governing bodies were first set up in Yugoslavia. And today my impression is that we are borrowing a lot from that country's experience. Could not that face us with the serious problems which I understand now face Yugoslavia?

V.BELOV
Chelyabinsk, U.S.S.R.

GLASNOST FROM OUR MAILBAG

DISCUSSING A PROBLEM

More about money

In issue No. 50, 1987, New Times carried an interview with Professor Nikolai Shmelyov. I personally was perplexed by it. He essentially advanced a peculiar model for the development of the national economy under which market forces would play a substantial role. I think Shmelyov's model, in which the problem of the social protection of the working people is not given due attention, is unlikely to be acceptable in our society. For instance, the proposal for the purchase of shares in enterprises by private individuals might create conditions for legalizing unearned income. It is no secret that the overwhelming majority of citizens of our country with large sums of money are involved in the "black" economy. And the thesis "what is effective is moral" holds no water, as "dirty money" thus becomes moral.

It goes without saying that all this is incompatible with the principle of social justice.

Besides that, the very logic of such a situation would suggest that managers turn a blind eye to the origin of some "cash injections," in the same way that the previous economic management system encouraged directors of enterprises to engage in report-padding and eyewash. Not long ago I heard the president of a recently formed cooperative declare at a meeting that he was prepared to accept a loan from anyone, even from a secret millionaire.

Paying compliments to the cooperative and individual sectors of the economy, Nikolai Shmelyov loses sight of the very real situation in which work in just that area would bring the greatest profits. The main motive forces of perestroika - industrial workers, scientists and technicians - would then play second fiddle. And this would inevitably lead to a fall-off in the productivity of labour in the state sector, the emergence of new disproportions and the erosion of living standards.

I believe there should be a more objective and sober approach to the economic situation that has evolved in our country. Our entire production potential should be taken into consideration, the cause of our development reassessed, and viewed as a whole, and from every angle, so that there can be no errors and aberrations. I think economists still have a big job to do.

A. RYABOV
Cand. Sc. (Hist.)
Moscow, U.S.S.R.



The sinking ship of the bureaucrats.
Drawing by Igor Smirnov

KEEP THE PROCESS GOING

Winter is still very much with us, but in international politics one can catch a whiff of spring winds of change. As realists, however, we should add not everywhere. But positive changes are taking place in many directions.

Without fear of exaggerating, there is reason to state that the ideas that form the backbone of the Soviet concept of a non-nuclear world are making headway. Although no radical turning point has been reached in the struggle for such a world, a start has been made.

The most convincing example of approaching change is, of course, the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of two classes of nuclear missiles. It has been described as the first ripe fruit from the tree of the new political thinking.

The document has earned the highest praise of the international community, as it has effectively opened, for the first time, the door to nuclear disarmament. And not only to nuclear disarmament, but also to the abolition of all systems of mass destruction.

The principles of the treaty can also be applied to chemical and bacteriological weapons, as well as to space weapons; and of course to conventional armaments, which is in our time something of a misnomer, as these weapons have become so lethal.

Last December, international relations were given a powerful positive impulse. And we must take advantage of this to start a chain reaction of progress in limiting and abolishing all types of weapon. The need for acceleration in this field has long been evident: it is only the talks in Vienna that have been dragging on without success for years.

The INF treaty dealt a blow to the old way of thinking, which had made a dogma of the claim that joint Soviet and U.S. action in the field of disarmament is impossible owing to the incompatibility of the two sides' objectives.

The immediate future will show how far the old concepts in international politics have receded. U.S. Senate committees have begun debating the INF treaty. It is expected to come up before the full Senate in April, which has to give President Reagan its advice and consent with regard to ratification.

That is the procedure. Naturally, no one expects it to be plain sailing. Both in the Senate and outside it there are many people opposed to the treaty. They would like to prevent it being ratified, or at least introduce amendments to the Soviet-U.S. document that would negate its significance.

Let us hope that that will not happen.

Ratification of the treaty is essential to preserve the atmosphere of constructive cooperation in which it was signed. And the Moscow summit is not far off. It's planned for the summer. The world awaits it with hope. With it are linked hopes for progress on another understanding reached in Washington. Readiness was expressed for a 50-per cent cut in strategic offensive weapons on condition - as both sides agreed - that the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems be preserved in the form in which it was signed in 1972. Other hopes linked with the Moscow summit are for progress on a treaty to end all nuclear tests, abolish chemical weapons, and cut conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe.

Without the long-overdue solution to all of these problems, no radical change for the better in the international situation can be achieved.

NEWS NT

At our editorial office members of the New Times staff met recently with an American colleague, James Jackson, who heads the Time magazine bureau in Moscow.

Mr Jackson spoke of the importance attached to the cover of a magazine. At the Time offices constant thought is given to what it should be like to attract readers (although the circulation of all editions of the magazine is by no means small - something like six million). In the past few months the Soviet leader has figured on the cover several times. Mr Jackson described the preparations for the cover of this year's first issue featuring Mikhail Gorbachev as "man of the year." The magazine's art editor was dispatched to Moscow and he selected three portraits from the studios of Moscow artists. However, eventually the magazine published a fourth portrait specially commissioned by Time from an artist from Fedoskino, where the famous lacquered boxes come from.

Mr Jackson had some words of praise for New Times artists, but added that one not always could discern the connection between the cover and a concrete story in the magazine.

He said that in his work he often uses NT publications. The main themes of his own stories lately have been perestroika and glasnost, although he keeps an eye on foreign policy and space as well.

Mr Jackson explained how Time operates: one or several correspondents report a story, then their reports land on the editor's desk, and he re-writes it from start to finish and cuts it. How many people work for Time! 60 correspondents in the United States and abroad, and about twice that number on the editorial staff, not to mention the even greater number of those responsible for advertising and sales. About two dozen people work on the magazine's layout alone.

New Times journalists were interested in their colleague's opinion of the English translation. Mr Jackson described it as fairly good, if a bit stiff. The impeccable correctness of the English, he added, reminds one of the Russian used by the magazine America.

Possible cooperation between Time and New Times was discussed in the course of the meeting.

Photo by V. Panov

The Soviet-American INF treaty has been hailed the world over as a first step towards disarmament. Welcoming the accord, the NATO foreign ministers said, "it opens the way to progress in other arms control areas." But the ink was hardly dry on the treaty when NATO states began

Looking for a "compensation"

Vyacheslav Boikov reports from Brussels:

On December 8, when the INF treaty was signed, Dutch Premier Rudolph Lubbers said his government had revised its decision to have the American F-16 and Orion fighter-bombers withdrawn from Dutch territory. These carriers of nuclear weapons were declared unwanted "aliens" in 1985. The Hague's promise to get them removed was to compensate the peace movement for its consent to the siting of American cruise missiles at Woensdrecht. Now we see a reverse compensation.

It might be said by some that this is a trifle. Indeed, the Dutch government's decision has not altered the balance of forces. It even passed unnoticed against the background of the Washington summit. However, it is a symptomatic signal.

Hardly a week had passed when fresh news came from London. The British and French defence ministers meeting there declared their intention jointly to develop an air-launched cruise missile. Many experts and journalists qualified it as a desire to get partial compensation for the Euromissiles to be destroyed. But Britain's Defence Secretary George Younger refuted this, stressing that it was a routine modernization of weapons.

However, it is a question of substance, not terms. Whatever London and Paris may say, the fact remains that the decision runs counter to the spirit, if not the letter, of the INF treaty and, in any case, does not contribute to progress in disarmament.

On December 16, the United States announced that it was starting the production of binary chemical weapons. This step has not only created a serious obstacle in the way of drafting an agreement on the abolition of chemical weapons, but has also poisoned the political climate as a whole.

On the same day the U.S. Strategic Air Command confirmed earlier reports about its plan to compensate for the Euromissiles to be scrapped. General John Chain, chief of the SAC, proposed fitting 150 B-52 strategic bombers with new-generation cruise missiles carrying non-nuclear warheads. Thanks to their high accuracy, these weapons could fulfil some of the tasks that had been assigned to the Pershing and Tomahawk nuclear missiles, now to be destroyed. The Popeye system devised in Israel and a joint tactical missile system being secretly developed in the United States are to be used for this purpose.

The ostensible reason for describing the tactical missile system as "joint" was that, in addition to the Strategic Air Command, the U.S. army is going to adopt it for service. Missiles of this type are to be deployed for the most part in Western Europe. According to The New York Times, the U.S. Navy is also preparing to close the Eurostrategic breach made by the INF treaty. It is purchasing large quantities of long-range cruise missiles both with nuclear and non-nuclear warheads.

All these events took place during the first week after the INF treaty was signed. But the chronology of military escalation did not end on December 16. Here is one of the fresh examples.

Speaking in Bonn on January 18, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze outlined a broad disarmament programme further to advance the process begun in Washington. In particular, he announced Moscow's readiness to set about dismantling battlefield nuclear arsenals in Europe. On the whole, this idea is approved by Bonn. However, it is opposed by most of the F.R.G. allies.

On the same day, NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe John Galvin said in a West German radio interview that he was against supplementing the double

The range of a modernized Lance missile is to increase nearly fourfold.



zero with a third one. Before raising the question of battlefield nuclear weapons, he noted, it is necessary first to reach agreement on strategic arms cuts, and solve the problem of conventional armaments. In other words, it is too early to talk about this subject, but it is time to build up tactical nuclear weapons.

John Galvin favours the early modernization of the Lance missile. But in fact he is proposing to adopt a new system for service. What it has in common with the Lance missile that has already been deployed is perhaps only its name. The present Lance has a range of 120 km, whereas the new missile would have a range of 450 km. Moreover, the accuracy of the new missile is to be substantially increased. It is more like a small Pershing than a big Lance. John Galvin and others of his ilk would like similarly to modernize NATO's conventional armed forces. The pinpoint accuracy of hitting targets will greatly reduce the distinction between conventional and tactical nuclear weapons.

On January 22 John Galvin met with a group of American journalists in Washington. In a talk with them he developed the ideas he had expressed in West Germany. The NATO commander had already spoken not about the modernization of separate systems but about a plan of broad rearmament. The United States, he pointed out, should create a new arsenal of battlefield nuclear weapons for Europe.

In addition to "modernized" Lance missiles, John Galvin would like to have a more powerful nuclear artillery at his disposal. The air force, he claimed, urgently needs a compact nuclear missile and a new generation of bombs. Trying to make the first nuclear disarmament agreement meaningless, the general at the same time declared that he supported the INF treaty and even favoured ratifying it.

Flatly rejecting the idea of a third zero, Western leaders usually say this step is impossible because the Soviet Union has a "huge superiority" in conventional armaments. If that is so, why has the West still not replied after eighteen months to the Warsaw bloc's proposal to start a drastic reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments? To eliminate existing imbalances and solve the difficult problem of asymmetry, Moscow has offered a fair alternative: cuts are to be made by the country that has more weapons of one or other type. What was the reply?

"We would have no objections if the Soviets began to reduce the imbalances unilaterally," Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek, current chairman of the Western European Union, said recently. But the West also has superiority in some types of weapon.

Demanding that the Warsaw bloc put its cards on the table, NATO wants to hide its own. For instance, Stephan Ledogar, chief U.S. negotiator at the Vienna talks, said in a televised interview on January 11 that priority should be given to a reduction in land forces. As for the air force and navy, the discussion of these questions should be postponed indefinitely. This is apparently because the East has a superiority in land forces while the West has more powerful air and naval forces. For it is impossible to allege, for instance, that a tank is more dangerous than a bomber or an aircraft carrier.

Let us assume, however, that the two blocs have managed to balance their conventional armaments. Will NATO then agree to the abolition of nuclear weapons? NATO Secretary-General Lord Carrington replies to this question thus: "Conventional forces, even in balance, have never prevented wars in the past." So "nuclear weapons at both theatre and strategic levels will remain indispensable." A vicious circle.

But is it possible to end the arms race and start real disarmament if the other side at the talks feels that attempts are being made to mislead it?

■

The INF treaty signed in Washington has generated plans to compensate for U.S. medium- and shorter-range missiles, and renewed the debate on the issue of a defence for Europe, something that has long been causing concern to West Europeans.

London:

The conventional weapons debate

Yuri Sagaidak discusses the issue with JOHN CROSS, Deputy Director of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Most Britons have welcomed the process of nuclear disarmament begun by the Soviet Union and the United States, along with the moves to create a climate of trust and greater mutual understanding in East-West relations. At the same time the view is current in British political circles that at the moment moves are above all needed to eliminate chemical weapons and reduce conventional weapons. After they have been taken, it would be possible to discuss the issue of further clearing the continent of nuclear arsenals. It follows from official pronouncements that some politicians intend to remain committed to that stand because, it is alleged, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty nations have a huge superiority in conventional weapons.

I asked Colonel John Cross for his assessment of the prospects for reducing conventional weapons in Europe and ways of dealing with the problems that arise in this connection.

The INF treaty signed in Washington has on the whole met with a positive response in Western Europe, John Cross says. Western experts believe that the adverse implications of eliminating medium- and shorter-range missiles are insignificant and that they are outweighed by the positive aspects of the Soviet-American treaty, which shows the political will to reduce nuclear weapons and lay a solid foundation for subsequent moves in that direction.

Far from everyone in the West is satisfied with the treaty, however. It is enough to recall a recent editorial in the Financial Times reflecting the views of the more influential circles in Britain. The editorial claimed that the Soviet-American treaty creates problems for NATO's defences.

The treaty does indeed to a certain extent limit the options open under the doctrine of flexible response. This induces NATO to begin to review its strategy in general, and its strategy of using nuclear weapons in particular. Over the next two or three years an important element in the structure of NATO's nuclear forces will be removed. The INF treaty has exacerbated the problem of conventional weapons



which NATO intends to upgrade and build up. That is fairly difficult to do, since the military budgets of the European partners in NATO have been frozen and even reduced in real terms.

I have heard a diametrically opposite view of the balance of strength between East and West in conventional weapons. Many people in the West believe that the Soviet Union and its allies are superior in that field, but there are also those who believe that there is an approximate parity. There is yet another point of view, those who subscribe to it maintaining that since the West European nations have greater economic and manpower potential and the technological edge they are superior in the military area. What are the views of your institute?

Recently we completed an extensive analysis of the balance of forces in Central Europe, where vast amounts of troops and military hardware of the WTO and NATO are concentrated, and on the entire territory of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. I must admit, however, that the data at our disposal is unlikely to be conclusive, as it naturally does not reflect such important, but unaccountable factors as the standard of training, morale, or the efficiency of troop management. Nor do they take account of the effectiveness of military doctrines. Besides, we are dealing with highly advanced hardware as well as outdated weapons. Therefore figures alone cannot reflect the true balance of forces.

At the same time fear is voiced in NATO countries over the fact that the WTO has more tanks and artillery pieces in Central Europe, that is, more weapons intended for attack rather than defence. Then NATO believes that the Soviet Union and its allies have an advantage in helicopters and warplanes, hence NATO's conclusion that the structure of the other side's forces is offensive, and the fears with regard to the military power and intentions of the Warsw Treaty Organization. It is a different question, however, whether there really are intentions that may be construed as a threat. I personally do not believe that there are such intentions.

On what data are these conclusions based?

As I have already pointed out the figures do not reflect the actual situation. For instance, there are more tanks on your side, but what kind of tanks? There are advanced tanks as well as obsolete tanks. I've heard that World War II T-34 tanks are still in service in Warsaw Treaty nations. I am sure you will agree that T-34s belong in a museum rather than on a modern battlefield. There are quite a few tanks designed in the 1950s and 1960s on your side. The West also has outdated tanks. This makes it difficult to assess the obtaining situation.

I believe that it might be a good idea if the Warsaw Treaty countries were to abandon their obsolete and inefficient hardware and, especially, old tanks. Their upkeep requires huge funds and great efforts, plus the considerable manpower resources employed in servicing hardware which, given today's anti-tank weapons, is of little value. Besides, the outdated hardware creates serious problems in assessing the balance of strength.

The Soviet army has a strong muscle. That is something that the West takes into account and respects, but I must say that in recent years the Soviet army has become overweight, if you will pardon the expression, and that this serves no useful purpose and is in fact detrimental to its combat efficiency. One would like to hope that the process of restructuring now under way in the Soviet Union will extend to the armed services and induce them to get rid of the extra weight. It is a burden that reduces the efficiency of the armed services and creates problems in the economy and in negotiations on reducing conventional weapons. Getting rid of outdated hardware would allay Western fears, since the West views tanks as a key issue, and give the East an opportunity to raise the issues with regard to Western forces that are causing its concern. This could get dialogue on reducing conventional weapons in Europe off to a good start. ■

Bonn:

A third superpower? Too dangerous and expensive

Dr Andreas von BÜLOW, a prominent figure in the Social Democratic Party of Germany

For decades Western Europe has been undecided over the issue of efficient defences for the divided continent. There is a growing awareness of the shared responsibility, but this does not rule out clashes of opinion. The two great powers have got down to disarmament, having begun to do away with some types of nuclear weapon, but this is unlikely to remove confrontation worldwide. Nevertheless, impatience has been growing on the other side of the Atlantic. Military spending is an intolerable burden, not only for the Soviet Union, but, quite obviously, for the United States as well. The Soviet Union has proposed comprehensive disarmament in the area of nuclear weapons as well as in conventional arms. It has said that its military doctrine will be an exclusively defensive one and proposed the appropriate reorganization of the armed forces on either side of the borders separating the two alliances. France has shown no particular interest in these

proposals. It wants to retain its nuclear status. On the other hand, concerned about neutralist trends, it has been insisting on greater integration with the F.R.G. West Germany has no nuclear weapons of its own and is therefore in a dependent position. It will be pressing for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

If NATO's strategy of a flexible response had provided for ways of dealing with the inevitable imbalances in conventional and nuclear weapons not only by building up military might, but by disarmament as well, a response to Moscow's proposals would have followed soon enough. At the moment, however, the situation is one of confusion, following many years of complaints about the East's conventional superiority. The nuclear powers in the West are talking of the dangers inherent in a nuclear-free Europe, as if possessing tactical nuclear weapons were an important goal. True, referring to its combat characteristics, a French general has described the German-French brigade being formed at the moment as a military orchestra. The French Defence Minister has given a warning to Michel, his German counterpart, that French troops would prefer to have the advantage of a nuclear umbrella. It is not yet clear how the brigade is to be incorporated into NATO's defences. Suggestions that it be included in the advanced echelons of defence and managed jointly were turned down. West Germany will have a negligible influence on French nuclear planning. The formation of the brigade is a token move that looks rather like a mere show of serious preparation for the defence of Europe.

France is not going to abandon its nuclear weapons under any circumstances. It does not even want to share the responsibility for using nuclear weapons. In order to get rid of the obstacle created by the inclusion of French as well as British nuclear weapons in West European defences, Western Europe must attain the status of an industrial, political and military superpower through political integration. It already has the necessary potential.

The West Europeans will have to follow this road until a threat of a military confrontation between East and West is not removed. But that option does not appear attractive to Europeans. That Europe is not a superpower is an advantage as far as Europeans are concerned. What safeguards will East-West relations require during decades if a new superpower emerges? Would the Soviet Union find itself surrounded by such giants as the U.S.A., Western Europe, China, and last but not least, Japan?

After the Eastern side had formulated the idea of a sufficient defence for both blocs, advanced some time ago by the Social Democrats, as a goal of Soviet policy, West German politicians acquired a motive for taking a closer look at it. Recognition by the two sides that they are capable of ensuring their defences while considerably reducing their offensive potential could finally bring the political will not to attack each other, expressed by the two alliances several decades ago into conformity with the actual defence and military structures.

The structure and weapons of the European armies are to undergo profound changes. Those who do not want to attack anyone can reduce offensive weaponry. A nation that will no longer have to beat back an invading army will accordingly require fewer weapons for a counter-offensive. As far as ground forces are concerned, they will require fewer tanks and armoured personnel carriers. This means that both alliances will have to conduct a large-scale reduction of these weapons to a certain agreed level. The fewer the tanks and personnel carriers, the greater the coveted superiority in defence.

The East will, however, forego its superiority in conventional weapons only if the West, in turn, gives something up. This will require cuts in the assault planes which the West needed in the first place to offset the East's advantage in ground forces. Given reciprocity, the air force component of Western defences could be considerably reduced. The East could then go on to demand joint cuts in intermediate and shorter range nuclear weapons. According to NATO doctrine, these weapons are also needed to offset the superiority of the other side in conventional weapons, and under the new set of circumstances there would be no need for them.

Following the Washington summit and the signing of the INF treaty, and after an agreement has been concluded on halving strategic nuclear arsenals, politicians in both alliances must consider the issue of European stability in the area of conventional weapons and try to define the essential features of that stability through an exchange of views. Europe wants no more disappointments.

The East has every right to insist on discussing strategies, doctrines, structures and weapons. Progress toward mutually sufficient defence can only be made jointly, or there will be failure. There is every reason to prefer this to the expense and risk of turning Western Europe into a superpower. ■

Confidence measures should be extended and strengthened. Military observers from the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic at NATO military exercises in the F.R.G.
Drawing and photos from Der Spiegel (F.R.G.)

PARIS KEEPS ITS NUCLEAR CRUTCH

DMITRY POGORZHELSKY



Paris and Bonn have celebrated the 25th anniversary of the Elysée Accord. There were speeches and champagne galore. The formation of joint bodies: a defence council, a military brigade and a financial-economic council - was announced to the cannonade of popping corks.

I have the impression that France, which is far from being at its economic best today, hopes to talk the F.R.G. into certain concessions considering the stability of the latter's currency and economy. All the more so as Bonn has been playing first fiddle in the Common Market since January 1. In exchange, Paris offered ever closer military cooperation, precisely on the basis of the appropriate clauses in the Elysée Accord. It is noteworthy that these clauses have remained on paper for years. Now the attitude to them is changing, and it looks as if the two capitals' long-standing dream of becoming the "locomotive" of the European community is going to materialize, and the locomotive is going to be an armoured one.

I do not think the joint brigade has anything to do with this. I shall permit myself to call a spade a spade. Paris is rapidly departing from de Gaulle's general defence concept confined exclusively to the national territory. The tendency to draw French concepts and doctrines closer to NATO's strategy of "flexible response" is becoming increasingly clear.

Prime Minister Jacques Chirac was quite explicit about this new trend. Within just a few days of the signing of the Soviet-U.S. INF treaty, he announced, in so many words, that in the event of an attack on the F.R.G., France would take counter-measures "immediately and unconditionally." To my mind, this promise is tantamount to the admission that Paris's nuclear forces will be brought into play from West German territory. Predictably, this peremptory statement caused some embarrassment in Bonn, and President Mitterrand tried to play things down a bit by reassuring the outside world that no promise of nuclear guarantees had been implied.

What then, did Chirac mean? An analysis will show that the points on which the President and the Prime Minister disagree are purely academic and boil down to what kind (tactical or strategic) of nuclear weapons are to be used, and when.

I realize, of course, that Chirac and Mitterrand are divided on the nuclear disarmament issue: the former is sceptical, and the latter seems to be in favour of it, as can be gathered at any rate from their reaction to the INF treaty. Nevertheless, the French leaders stubbornly insist that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. are the only two countries to disarm, and assign the role of "the pillar of European defence" to France. What's more, they are even clamouring for the all-round expansion and strengthening of military cooperation within the framework of the West European alliance.

Nuclear guarantees don't guarantee security

Paris is afraid lest the disarmament process, if it continues, should ultimately affect French strategic and tactical missiles, and apprehensive of Bonn's apparent inclination to accept the "third nuclear zero" option. This explains why Paris declined to discuss the tactical nuclear weapon problem in the course of Erich Honecker's recent visit to France. Hence the attempts to "tie" Bonn down with its nuclear guarantees.

I do not rule out the possibility of these guarantees implicating neutron weapons as well. Why not? After all, the Americans and the French present them as defensive, first and foremost. Since American missiles, a vital component of nuclear deterrence, are to go, with the Warsw Treaty countries retaining their superiority in tanks, something must be done about that "threat." What, for example? The answer, albeit so far only implicit, is to bring French neutron weapons to the fore. I believe the newly formed joint defence council will deal with this problem in earnest at Paris's suggestion - true, somewhat later, after this spring's presidential elections. So far, there has been no overt mention of this. Most people still have vivid memories of the protests against the American neutron bomb, which barred its way to Western Europe 10 years ago. That was an American bomb, mind you, and now the European version of it is in question. Psychologically, it might indeed be easier to reconcile the public with the European neutron bomb, all the more so after the removal of the American Euromissiles. Time will tell...

I am not alone in thinking, however, that Paris obviously craves the role of leader of the West European defence, and aspires to fill the vacuum left by American intermediate-range missiles with its own.

Hence the revival of the Elysée Accord's military clauses, Paris's stubborn unwillingness to join in the nuclear disarmament process even in the foreseeable future, and the intention to modernize its chemical weapons arsenal. Paris is in no position to assume economic leadership of Western Europe. It is therefore trying to back its claims to such leadership by building up its military might (nuclear included), flirting with Bonn and promising to protect the F.R.G.'s territory.

The West European leaders have increasingly frequently of late been professing the Old World's striving to "speak with one voice" and be on a par with the two great powers when it comes to security problems. This striving is understandable and justified. But leaning on the nuclear crutch is hardly a proper stance at a time when the two great powers are having talks on nuclear disarmament.

Lt. Col. Rico tries again

Troops loyal to the government put down the mutiny

An infantry regiment stationed in the town of Monte Caseros, 630 km north of Buenos Aires, rose in revolt. The putschists were led by Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico.

The events that led to the insurrection and the serious aggravation of the political situation in Argentina took place just before the New Year. On December 30, Aldo Rico, who since last April had been under house arrest at the Campo de Mayo garrison, left his residence in full dress uniform. Accompanied by several officers he arrived at the villa Fresnos, which was owned by a friend of his, 25 km outside Buenos Aires. Rico and his accomplices set up their headquarters at the villa and issued a statement demanding the resignation of a number of military leaders, and a full amnesty for the military men involved in the gross violations of human rights under the military regimes.

Lieutenant Colonel Rico is not a new figure on the Argentinian political scene. He became widely known last year when in April, together with several fellow-officers, he took over the infantry school in Campo de Mayo and held it for four days.

That escapade proved a failure. Almost the entire country, all political parties, the General Confederation of Labour and the greater part of the armed forces came out in defence of democracy and condemned the putschists. Rico was arrested and stripped of his military rank.

Towards the end of the year the investigation by the civilian legal bodies of the case against Rico as the instigator of the rebellion had been completed. The indictment and other material pertaining to the investigation were turned over to the Chief of Staff of the ground forces, General Jose Segundo Dante Caridi. Then the Ministry of National Defence announced that Rico's rank had been restored so that he could be tried by a military tribunal, not a civilian court, as originally planned. The Federal police were ordered to arrest him.

On learning of this, Rico secretly fled to one of the infantry regiments stationed near the town of Monte Caseros. There he found support among a group of officers and NCOs, who demanded Caridi's resignation. The commanding officer of the regiment, Colonel Hector Alvarez, sent out messages to all military units saying he refused to obey Caridi's orders.

On Sunday January 17, the staff headquarters of the ground forces issued a communiqué underlining the determination of the military command to suppress the anti-constitutional action at any cost, even resorting to the use of force.

Lt. Col. Aldo Rico.
From O Diario (Portugal)

The putschists, meanwhile, were also preparing to offer strong resistance. They took up positions on the approaches to Monte Caseros, mined the bridges and main roads leading to the town, dug trenches and set up machine-gun positions. Shortly afterwards, 2,000 officers and re-enlisted men loyal to the government and led by General Caridi, who had earlier dismissed the commanding officers of units that had refused to obey his order to deal with the colonel, were sent into the area. The battle started just before noon. Three hours later Rico and about 200 of his accomplices decided to give themselves up. The garrisons that had supported the rebels in Neuquen, San Luis, Tucuman and Santa Cruz provinces also surrendered, as did the group of commandos who had taken over and held the George Newberry airport in the capital for several hours. They were all immediately dispatched to a military prison.

Why did the rebels surrender so quickly? Probably because the Rico group found itself isolated. It had apparently overestimated its strength and counted on greater support among the military.

The rebels were neutralized even before the wave of protest demonstrations swept the country. But they apparently realized that they had no chance of succeeding. This was confirmed by the joint declaration issued in Buenos Aires by the seven leading opposition parties, and giving their unanimous backing to the government.

On January 19, the military tribunal began the preliminary investigation of the cases of 282 persons (including 60 officers and 222 sergeants) arrested after attempts to stage insurrections in different military garrisons. Rico was transferred to the Magdalena high security prison in Buenos Aires Province. That is the prison where five representatives of the military junta are serving sentences from four years to life for the organization of repressions during the period of the military dictatorship.

The first stage of the investigation involves obtaining evidence from witnesses and formulating the charges. Observers note that the whole affair could take anything from a month to several years. The leader of the insurrection could face a 25-year sentence.

At the same time, the chairman of the Senate Defence Commission, T. Berongaray, said that if the military code is strictly applied, then Rico and the other rebels could face death sentences.

The authorities are still searching for

three of Rico's closest aides who have gone into hiding: former Major Ernesto Barriero, who led the insurrection in Cordova last April, Lieutenant Colonel Angel Leon, leader of the revolt in the northern town of Tucuman, and Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Venturino, who is believed to have masterminded the Rico insurrection.

In the Rico affair, and the second attempt to start a revolt, there is one interesting detail - the officer himself was not involved in any violations of human rights under the military regime. Moreover, he had excelled in the battles with the British on the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in 1982. This had earned him the reputation of an honest officer.

After the April mutiny was crushed, Rico, though under arrest, remained a hero in the eyes of part of the officers, and he felt their moral support. The local right-wing press sought fairly actively to represent him an Argentine Rambo.

Apparently the reactionary influential economic and political circles that stood behind him believed that Rico's reputation could mislead the public and help them destabilize the government of President Raul Alfonsin. They clearly hoped that the troops sent to crush the revolt would refuse to fire on the putschists, as was the case during last year's attempted putsch. And that, they believed, would allow them to negotiate with the authorities, getting one concession after another from them and thus making progress towards the restoration of their lost privileges.

But things did not turn out that way. Lieutenant Colonel Rico lost the second round as well. And the fact that army units obeyed the orders of President Alfonsin (under the Constitution, he is the Supreme Commander of the country's armed forces) to crush the revolt, and quickly obtained the surrender of the putschists, and that the police and gendarmes restored control over the airport, thereby demonstrating their readiness to defend the Constitution, indicates clearly that the President has strengthened his position. But it would clearly be incorrect to conclude that the crisis in the Argentine armed forces has been completely resolved. Among the military there are still many opponents of the present regime, men who do not want to give up their attempts to win back their former control over the country.

It should be noted that the situation in the armed forces is being closely watched in Washington. Following the April revolt, the U.S. State Department gave instructions to resume ties with Argentine military circles for the purpose of gathering information on the situation in the armed forces. Such ties were broken off following the Falklands war. The Pentagon has received permission for direct contacts with Argentine military departments, bypassing the Foreign Ministry.

ALEXANDER BARYSHEV

NICARAGUA

When will the fighting stop?

PAVEL BOGOMOLOV

The Tora, a Costa Rican fishing vessel, found itself in Nicaraguan territorial waters. Had it happened just a few months earlier, when tension in the area was high, the border guards would unhesitatingly have confiscated the schooner, or at least its catch and fishing tackle. And now the crew were only reprimanded. What lies behind this change of attitude?

For an answer to this question I went to San Juan del Sur, a port town not far from the place where the schooner was detained.

It is a quiet townlet reminding one of half-forgotten slumbering towns from Alexander Grin's stories, its low tile-roofed houses nestling around a picturesque bay. Today its population is a mere 8,000. But a century and a half ago, it was a bustling seaport at the juncture of the most convenient sea lanes linking the Pacific and Atlantic coasts of the U.S.

"We do have a rich history," says Cesar Augusto Guadamus, a young man and the town's alcald, as mayors are called in Spanish-speaking countries. "What today matters most, however, is the changed political climate in the region. The Tora case is by no means an exception or a chance occurrence. The Guatemala accords signed last August between five Central American states oblige us all to display maximum good will, tact, tolerance and respect towards our neighbours."

Things have become easier for people who have frequently to go through frontier formalities - traders, heavy truck drivers, specialists and employees, and tourists, the alcald went on.

"Though the situation has stabilized in our sector of the border," he concluded, "subversive radio propaganda subsidized with CIA funding continues - which is only to be regretted."

Yes, peace and serenity have prevailed in San Juan del Sur, Pena Blanca and some other border areas, but this is true of far from everywhere. One seat of instability is in the vicinity of the settlement of Quilali.

"Interviewing" the bandits

"There were six of us," recalls Maureen Meehan, an NBC correspondent in Managua. Six foreign newsmen went to Quilali, having got wind of the alleged surrender of some bandit group commanded by a man called Nolan. They reached the slopes of Mount Chipote where the band was stationed. But Nolan proved to be unfit for interviewing.

"He is evidently a drug addict," Ms Meehan goes on. "He never stayed still. He bounced up and down, started dancing, guffawed one moment, and then got aggressive.

"With great difficulty we managed to get out of the contra camp. But to our consternation we saw that Araucano, the ringleader of another band, and his thugs were waiting for us at the place where we had left our cars. 'Take aim at those scribblers,' he ordered, and kept us at gunpoint for half an hour."

Some time passed before the newsmen shook off the contras and reached Quilali late at night. Next morning they sent their dispatches, giving a true account of the "freedom fighters" who, as Maureen said, don't want to hear of national reconciliation.

"I hope I will never see them again, even out of curiosity," the American journalist concluded her story. "They were armed to the teeth, without any apparent expediency, and made no secret of the fact that a special plane had brought them ammunition from Honduras the day before. In parting, the drunken Nolan said he only was letting us go because we were foreigners."

What serious politicians think

In the light of all this, one wonders how serious statesmen, including Central American leaders, view the continuing U.S. aid to Nolan and his ilk. And in general, what is the attitude towards the bloodshed still going on in the region?

"I have never favoured the armed settlement of disputes," Costa Rican President Oscar Arias gave this carefully worded and at the same time quite unequivocal answer when newsmen asked him how he assessed U.S. attempts to involve other states in the escalation of the undeclared war against Nicaragua.

"We should devise mechanisms for taking even the regime's opponents into the life of our country," said Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo, as he signed a bill on amnesty for insurgents.

The House of Representatives is not disposed to make new allocations for military aid to the contras in Nicaragua, Jim Wright, Democratic leader in Congress, said authoritatively.

The White House and the contras

Washington sets great store by these people, who have annihilated about 46,000 their compatriots and inflicted material damage assessed at over 2.8 billion dollars in the years of the undeclared war. It is immaterial for Washington propagandists that after the staggering blows of the Sandinist army just a handful of 6,500 contras remain in action - only a fifth of what was promised to be sent against Nicaragua by the end of this year. What matters is the very fact of their existence.

The Nicaraguan President has more than once proposed to start direct negotiations with the contras' powerful backers, only to encounter arrogant U.S. refusals.

Brushing aside the weighty accusations of insincerity, the U.S. administration has taken out its last trump card. It asserts that it is dissatisfied with the reconciliation process in Nicaragua alone. As for the other countries in the region, here everything is to its liking. That is not true. Washington is displeased with the situation in other countries, too. According to the Salvadoran Communist Party, it is going out of its way to disrupt national reconciliation in El Salvador. U.S. special services evinced anything but an unselfish interest in the talks between the Guatemalan insurgents and the Cerezo government spokesmen in progress in Madrid. The shuttle Central American tour Reagan's representative Morris Busby undertook in January to talk the "junior partners" into virtually boycotting the settlement process has evoked resentment in the region's peace-loving public.

In short, peaceful albeit inconsistent dialogue between the opposing forces in Central America does not tally with Washington's hegemonistic policy south of Rio Grande.

This was borne out once again on January 15-16, when Central American Presidents met in San Jose. After the meeting, the Nicaraguan government lifted the state of emergency all over the country. Constitutional rights and guarantees have been restored, such as the right to strike, the freedom of speech, association and assembly. Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto has said that an amnesty for some 3,300 political prisoners, 1,800 ex-Somozists and 1,500 contras, will be announced after a cease-fire with the contras or when any state agrees to accept the prisoners.

In Miami, news agencies report, contra representatives have declared their intention to start direct negotiations with the Sandinist government provided they cover not only a cease-fire but also democratization in Nicaragua.

What is implied is the renunciation of revolutionary gains and the return to old ways. And in this they certainly take their cue from Washington.

On the eve of the forthcoming talks the contras again demanded major political concessions from the Nicaraguan government as a precondition for a cease-fire. Their leader Alfredo Cesar, a member of the derectorate of the so-called "Nicaraguan resistance," has declared that the hostilities in Nicaragua are of a political nature and that therefore, to insure democratization in the country, military and political problems should be resolved simultaneously.

Managua - Moscow

Nueva Segovia department. Sandinist army soldiers during a lull in the fighting.

Photo by P. Bogomolov

Boomerang

Reliance on force breeds weakness

FELIX GORYUNOV,
New Times economic analyst

Since the days of the cold war the economic priorities of the U.S ruling circles have been yielding to the strategy of "rolling back communism" by armed might.

However, the policy of strength did harm to the economy.

The motives of the policy makers

The costly military intervention in Indo-China accelerated the progress of the "creeping" inflation of the 1960s into the "galloping" depreciation of the dollar. In the 1970s the economic situation in the West was characterized by the new term - stagflation - a mixture of stagnant growth rates with chronic inflation. The United States' currency and financial position had also considerably weakened.

In the 1980s the reliance of rightists in the U.S. on the policy of strength has noticeably increased. It took much effort to have the "Vietnam syndrome" overcome and bring it home to the public that the country needed "rearmament" to face the allegedly growing "Soviet threat." The intention was to exhaust the Soviet Union economically with a new round of the arms race and once again attempt to achieve military superiority. The right hoped that militarization would give the economy a new lease of life, and restore the global hegemony of the United States.

In social policy, said the American left-wing magazine, The Progressive, in 1981, "Reagan's desperate gamble is to try to save the economy - or at least buy more time for it - by dismantling the welfare state for the poor while preserving the welfare state for the rich." In its policy towards the developing nations, the West also gave preference to the rich.

In the 1980s the "rich North" began to curtail aid through government channels. The developing nations found themselves in the suffocating grip of transnational bankers who pumped currency out of them in the form of usurious interest rates. Unfair terms of trade and huge foreign debts brought the economic growth of whole regions of the Third World almost to a standstill.

As a result of this strategy, the world capitalist economy became closely linked to the American market and increasingly dependent on the economic situation in the United States, and Washington's monetary and credit as well as budget and military policies. In its turn, the United States began to be affected, as never before, by the world economic situation, and experienced increasing dependence on the financial support of its partners in the Group of Seven. Their support was a guarantee that the leader of the West would be able to sustain any pressure, but the strain of Reaganomics proved too heavy.

Federal budget deficits, accumulating from year to year, have brought the U.S. national debt to 2.3 trillion dollars. And the government is not the only spendthrift. Federal and local authorities, corporations and consumers themselves owe about 8 trillion dollars.

The U.S. domestic debt consists for the most part of the mutual liabilities of the various sectors of its economy. The U.S. foreign debt, which exceeded 400 billion dollars last year, is a different matter. The magazine Business Week fears that if the flow of foreign goods and capital continues to grow as quickly as it is doing at the moment, the U.S. foreign debt could reach a trillion dollars by the early 1990s. The United States' increasing external debt is fraught with very grave consequences for the capitalist monetary and credit system where the dollar is the principal unit of exchange in intergovernment and commercial transactions.

Despite the growth of the U.S. foreign debt, confidence in the dollar has been sustained up till now by intensive business activity in the United States and the readiness of Japan and the West European countries to invest there. The Bank for International Settlements estimates that the inflow of private funds into the United States reached 108 billion dollars in 1986. However, last year the influx all but petered out, and the financing of the overseas ally had to be taken up by the central banks of Japan and Western Europe through "monetary interventions."

To prevent a sharp drop in the rate of exchange for the dollar, these banks used their dollar reserves to purchase U.S. Treasury bonds, thereby covering the U.S.

A scene in front of the U.S. embassy.
From The Financial Times (Britain)

balance of payments and federal budget deficits. Last year this intervention cost Japan and Western Europe roughly 100 billion dollars. However, this sum is a drop in the ocean compared with the two trillion dollars daily circulated on international money markets.

A sizeable proportion of foreign assets in the United States consists of short-term investments that can be quickly withdrawn. Western economists therefore fear that another stock market crash or

The second article in the series. For the first article, "Does history repeat itself?", see No.3.

plummeting of the dollar could trigger off a huge flow of capital out of the United States resulting in financial chaos.

Internal disbalances

Can the U.S. economic policy makers at least smooth over the dollar crisis, if not find a way out of it altogether? The possibilities exist, the chief of them being the further lowering of the dollar exchange rate by the "softlanding" method.

The fall in the dollar over three successive years has halved its value and has already given American exporters a competitive edge. Last year deliveries of U.S. goods climbed 13 per cent, and of U.S. plant as much as 16 per cent. Though this is clearly not enough to bridge the gap between imports and exports in the next few years (the U.S. foreign trade deficit totalled about 170 billion dollars in 1987), the beginning of this process could increase trust in the U.S. currency, the more so as devaluing it has already reduced labour costs in American economy. Calculations by a West German bank suggest that by mid-1987 the labour costs of America's manufacturing industry were 20 per cent lower than those in the Federal Republic of Germany, and about the same as those in Japan.

One more advantage of the devalued U.S. currency is that the cost of the U.S. foreign debt in other currencies is reduced. The dollar can also be strengthened by revaluing U.S. gold reserves at their market price. Judging by vague hints from some American financiers, they do not exclude a return to the gold standard.

Will similar or other measures for shoring up the dollar remove the strains on the world capitalist economy? There are as many unknown factors here as there are other "external disbalances," the euphemism used by Western economists for the grave disproportions in the present system of international economic relations. In this lies the basic difference from the depression of the early 1930s.

Then the dislocation of international trade and the monetary instability were caused by cyclical crises in a handful of countries. Today the picture is different. A global recession is developing in an already unstable world economic situation. Here are a few of the most important external disbalances.

Slowing down of growth and disproportions in world trade. The annual figure for world trade growth was 6.7 per cent in the 1960s and 8.5 per cent in the 1970s. Between 1980 and 1986 it averaged under 3 per cent.

In the next few years the huge U.S. trade and current account deficits will remain. The OECD projects that the U.S. current acount deficit will fall to 134 billion dollars in 1988 and 105 billion in 1989, while Japan and the F.R.G. are expected to have current account surpluses of 81 and 41 billion dollars respectively, in 1988, and 79 and 32 billion dollars in 1989. Even the OPEC states will be unable to balance their international accounts, with their total balance of payments deficit projected at 6 billion dollars in 1988 and 4 billion in 1989.

Price fluctuations. By the mid-1980s the world prices of raw materials had slumped to the level of the Depression and only inched up a little in 1987. Despite this rise, World Bank experts believe, average prices of exports from developing countries fell 26 per cent between 1980 and 1986, thereby substantially cutting their currency earnings.

Oil prices are particularly unstable, jumping to 34 dollars a barrel (159 litres) in the early 1980s, falling to 10 dollars in 1986, and fluctuating at around 18 dollars a barrel today.

Foreign debts. By the mid-1980s, the United States had become the world's biggest debtor. Among the other industrial capitalist countries, Australia, Canada and Denmark also have substantial foreign debts. But the Third World's debt of more than a trillion dollars is particularly disturbing. A drop in exports inevitably following a slump in the industrial countries will make it impossible for many Third World nations to repay and service their debts.

Credit discrimination. Western bankers have almost stopped extending credits to developing nations because of their immense indebtedness. In the first eight months of 1987, borrowers raised 196 billion dollars on the international capital markets. The lion's share of this sum (85 per cent) was taken by industrial capitalist countries. Japanese companies received 34 billion dollars, thus becoming the world's biggest borrower of capital.

The let-up in the flow of credits to Third World countries, together with the substantial losses to their currency earnings because of the lower prices of raw materials and the shrinking of international trade, is fraught with the likelihood of an even greater exacerbation of the debt crisis.

Shift in financial power. Following the stock market crash, Japan has surpassed the United States in the amount of stock capital. At the end of October, the cost of capital on the Tokyo Stock Exchange was estimated at 2.6 trillion dollars, on the New York Stock Exchange 2.3 trillion, and on the London Stock Exchange at 634 billion dollars. Earlier, Japan had become the world's biggest creditor, with 1.1 trillion dollars in overseas assets. This factor, plus Japan's trading power, and the great scientific and technological potential of some of its leading industries, confirm the view of Western analysts that the centre of gravity is shifting in the capitalist world.

This tendency was also highlighted by the crash on the Black Monday, October 19,1987,which the Tokyo Stock Exchange, unlike the New York Stock Exchange,was able to absorb. This provided food for thought for politicians as well as for businessmen and economists.

The chill of the void

"An autumn gale is blowing through the world's stock markets. It has brought with it an unpleasant reminder of just how dependent on the United States other countries are," the London Sunday Telegraph complained. "Like a ruined nobleman, it has passed on its problems to others.... This decrease in the credibility of the United States poses difficult choices for Western Europe and Japan.... The stock markets have sounded the alarm, and already they feel the chill of the void."

In the opinion of Financial Times journalist Barry Riley, this void is already being filled. "We are in the middle of a major shift in world economic and financial power away from the U.S. and towards Japan," he writes.

A new redivision of the capitalist world? No, it is a new strategic division of labour between the United States and Japan. The Economist hopes that Pax Nipponica will complement Pax Americana, not supersede it in the way Pax Americana replaced Pax Britannica as Britain's empire waned."

The essence of "complementing it" was explained at the end of 1986 by Jim Robinson, head of American Express, who wrote that it was time for Japan to launch a Marshall plan. "As in General Marshall's day, the security of the non-communist nations is today imperilled by challenges that will not yield to simple military strength," he pointed out. "As world trade languishes and developing nations struggle with their debt obligations, dreaded enemies born of economic decline gather strength across the globe."

Marushyaru Keikaku, as this plan is called in Japanese, will help defeat these enemies. Jim Robinson believes that Tokyo should grant big credits to less developed nations, open its market to foreign goods, and stabilize the international monetary system pivoted on the dollar. "With the U.S. spending around 6 per cent of its GNP on defence, Japan's role over time would be to match in economic terms the U.S. military contribution to security (of the West - F.G.)."

In terms of capital and financial power, Japan could indeed be able to measure up to the new role. However, Tokyo is still cautious of assuming the new quality of "strategic partnership." The recent visit of Premier Noboru Takeshita to Washington showed that Japan is prepared to increase military expenditure (by 5.2 per cent) and

aid to developing nations (by 6.5 per cent), stimulate domestic consumption, and even pay the maintenance costs of American military bases on its territory. But in the light of the role assigned it by Western strategists, Japan's contribution to the elimination of external disbalances is still far from the ambitious Marushyaru Keikaku.

Nor is the European Community anxious to fill the strategic void. It is mainly preoccupied today with how best to protect the West European economy from the aftermath of the stock market crash and ensuing financial instability. Speaking in the European Parliament at the end of October, Jacques Delors, president of the Commission of the European Communities, made a plea for closer European monetary and economic cooperation, in particular by giving the European currency unit the full status of a monetary reserve, stimulating economic growth in Western Europe, and working out a European plan to tackle the problem of foreign debt. These are important, though by no means strategic, objectives.

"The paradox of the present situation is that, while the United States has lost its freedom of manoeuvre, neither Japan nor the Common Market is ready to assume the role of leader of the West," a prominent West German economist told me in Geneva.

It will be recalled that the Great Depression of the 1930s, which was an economic catastrophe for the capitalist system, brought about a shift in the alignment of imperialist forces. Britain, the leader of capitalism since the 19th century, had obviously ceded to the United States in economic and financial power. In those troubled times, German imperialism, with its fanatical nazi idea of a "new order," emerged on the world political scene.

The use of the adjective "world" in the Western press, economic surveys and communiqués from the OECD and the Group of Seven invariably draws a smile and, as the attentive reader will notice, we add the word "capitalist" when they are in a quotation.

Old habits die hard, of course. But in this case they are rather a manifestation of inert thinking and reluctance to see present-day realities. For the socialist and developing nations are actively involved on the world economic scene.

What security?

With all the differences between their economic and social structures and levels of development, all members of the world community are concerned about the present state of international economic relations. In connection with the danger of grave economic consequences ensuing from the stock market crash, this concern was voiced at a meeting of the second (economic and financial) committee of the U.N. General Assembly. At the 42nd session of the U.N. General Assembly, delegates from developing countries also stressed the need to make the international economic situation "more stable and predictable."

The Soviet Union is also concerned about the possibility of a world economic recession, and not merely because a fall in prices and demand for its traditional exports will reduce its hard-currency earnings, as happened in 1986 and 1987. In carrying out the economic reform, we pin great hopes on the expansion of foreign economic ties. The regulation of these ties has been decentralized, and measures are being taken to improve Soviet export patterns.

With a view to joining actively in international business exchanges, the Soviet Union is revising its foreign economic policy and its approach to global economic and ecological security issues, as well as to problems of development and foreign debt. It also believes that the role of the United Nations in the tackling of all world problems should be radically increased.

In talks with the senior officials and officers of U.N. agencies based in Geneva, as well as with economists, journalists and Zurich bankers, I satisfied myself that they are keenly interested in Soviet perestroika. They also spoke highly of what they called the "new global thinking" of the Soviet leadership, the essence of which was formulated in Mikhail Gorbachev's article, "Realities and Guarantees for a Secure World," published last September. Significantly, they approved of Moscow's close linkage of international military and political security with economic security.



They laid down their arms in 1945 and armed themselves with robots 40 years later.

From Fortune (U.S.A.)

The financial crisis that erupted after September 1987, when the Soviet Union again submitted the question of international economic security to the U.N. General Assembly, strikingly confirmed the urgency of the issue. It also emphasized the need for the question to be tackled by the whole of the international commnity, and not by the narrow Grop of Seven, the Group of Five (the United States, Japan, the F.R.G., Britain and France), or, as often now happens, the Group of Three (the United States, Japan and the F.R.G.).

With the present disproportions in international trade and the monetary and credit system, another economic recession in the West would be likely to take on a global character. It will be possible at least to ease the consequences of such a recession, if not to avert it completely, only by the efforts of the entire world community, and not the "world" in the narrow Western understanding of the word.

40 years ago

The lessons of postwar attempts to ensure "the security of the non-communist world" demonstrate that the military and political structure of one or other variant of "strategic partnership," far from removing, merely increases another threat, "the threat of economic decline."

To avert this threat, it is necessary to step up the disarmament process launched in Washington last December and extend it to strategic and, subsequently, to conventional armaments, as this is the only reasonable way to achieve military and, equally, economic security. Disarmament for development could become a source of financial and material resources which would breathe new life into the world economy.

In international relations, new thinking also means shifting priorities in trade and financial policy, and restructuring the activity of a number of international economic organizations.

When I expressed this view in a talk with officers from the secretariat of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, one of them asked me: "Do you really hope that the West will alter the international economic structures to enable the Soviet Union take part in them?" I explained that it was a matter not of Moscow's wishes but of these structures no longer meeting present-day requirements. They fail to take into account the realities of the world economy, the fact that it has become a multipolar economy and that the interests of all states should therefore be carefully balanced.

Renunciation of the pro-Western or, more exactly, pro-American orientation of the institutions regulating international trade, monetary and credit relations would prove beneficial to the Western countries as well.

It would be naive to believe that the West's economic policy makers will start thinking in a new way overnight. However, the present situation in the capitalist world economy makes one reflect on, or at least recall, some lessons of the past.

While American and French tanks were still fighting their way to Paris, a conference held at Bretton Woods, near New York, in July 1944, laid the foundations of the postwar international monetary and credit system. Three years later, another conference, this time in Havana, adopted the charter of the International Trade Organization of which, because of pressure from Washington, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has remained and is effective to this day. These two systems of international trade and finance were devised and created by the West's most brilliant economists in order to prevent its economy from plunging into yet another great depression.

In the late 1940s, these economists believed that another such crisis could be averted by cooperation between all states concerned, primarily those that had suffered the tragedy of the Second World War. The Soviet Union was invited to the Bretton Woods Conference and had observer status at the talks on establishing the International Trade Organization. But it did not accede to these agreements because Washington's great-power schemes prevailed over the economic expediency of international business cooperation.

Today the capitalist economy is facing a new recession, partly because its captains have forgotten the lessons of the past. Can it really be that only a new economic and social cataclysm will make them understand the realities of the present-day world?

Geneva-Zurich-Basel-Moscow

Soviet economists comment on stock market crash

The causes and repercussions of the panic that rocked stock markets last autumn were examined by the learned council of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences' Institute of World Economics and International Relations at its January meeting, with Academician Evgeny Primakov in the chair.

Ivan Korolev, Deputy Director of the Institute, noted in his opening address that the principal cause of the stock exchange boom and the subsequent crash was the loss of contact between the financial and material production spheres.

The cyclical slump and soaring inflation of the early 1980s, had been followed in the United States by a prolonged upturn in the economy characterized by a moderate growth rate and a fall in inflation, he said. Qualitative indices of the economy, especially its technological level and ability to readjust quickly had assumed special importance.

Meanwhile, the stock markets had not adapted to the fall in the inflation rate, with share prices continuing to rise. Thus, the financial boom in the United States and other Western countries did not reflect the actual state of affairs in their economies. This had led to a stock market crash which corrected this discrepancy. For this reason, Ivan Korolev pointed out, one should not exaggerate the significance of the autumn crash and draw a direct parallel with the 1929 crisis.

In his opinion, the effects of the crash have been both adverse and beneficial. The tumble in share prices, wiping out roughly two trillion dollars, could well improve the financial basis of the capitalist economy. The impact of the stock market crisis on the economy depends on how long the Western states will be able to maintain the low rates of inflation. A great deal will also depend on the economic policy coordination of leading capitalist nations, which has now been intensified.

Rivold Entov, Vladimir Shenayev, Vladimir Musatov, Leonid Grigoryev, Vladimir Kuznetsov, Valery Zaitsev and other prominent Soviet economists took part in the discussion. They agreed that in the last five years the stock exchange boom had been generated by not only economic but also specific financial factors, including the deregulation of the financial and credit sphere. Speculation on the stock markets had been instigated by the huge budget and current account deficits of the United States. It was the loss of credibility in the dollar and U.S. economic policy as a whole that had provoked the stock market crisis, which spread quickly throughout the capitalist world.

The discussion of the impact of the crash on the Western economy revealed several points of view. According to one of them, the stock market is still a barometer of the capitalist economy. Therefore the possibility of a slowdown in economic growth cannot be excluded, though a deep crisis is unlikely.

Another view is that the stock market crash was caused by imbalances in the financial and credit sphere and thus can have only an indirect effect on economoic growth. Banks on the whole sat out the slump in stock market activity and sustained relatively small losses. There are no grounds either for speaking of a large-scale crisis of the financial and credit system of capitalism. It is rather a spontaneous (or inspired) correction of the obviously inflated share prices.

The stock exchange panic clearly influenced the financial markets. The fall in share prices and the simultaneous weakening of the dollar cast doubts on the ability of central banks of the Group of Seven to stabilize the monetary situation. The situation did not improve even after U.S. partners had bought a record 130 billion dollars in the course of financial interventions last year, thereby propping up the dollar and continuing to cover the U.S. current account deficit.

This has once more confirmed the dependence of the capitalist countries on the economic situation in the United States, and the need for joint action to offset the adverse effects of Washington's extravagant financial policy. Therefore in the future too, the problem of the dollar will remain central to international economic relations, given the growing interdependence of all states.

BORIS FYODOROV

What has changed?

ALEXANDER GUBER

Comment on 1987 statistics

The traditional report on our performance over the last year is now more detailed and objective than ever. It takes up three full newspaper pages. At will, however, one can find in it data to confirm any assessment of the state of affairs in our economy, from overly optimistic to hopelessly pessimistic.

Such is the logic of economic progress in general, and the radical economic reform now underway in the country makes it all the more pronounced. So the most dangerous thing to do now is to get carried away with figures, especially those selected with the express purpose of supporting any extreme viewpoint. This is exactly what the opponents of the reform are after: they seek to prove either that all is going well, that we have already achieved the main objective, with just a few finishing touches left to be made; or that everything remains as it has always been, that no changes are forthcoming - or can possibly be made, for that matter - and that all our efforts are in vain.

It is important to realize that in itself the new economic mechanism now in the making could not have had a decisive effect on the economic showing of 1987. This mechanism cannot be expected to bring serious practical results at this early stage. Hopefully, we shall not repeat the mistake of 1965 when, with an economic reform still in progress, we got down to scrupulous calculations in terms of percentages and even fractions of percentages - and then drew far-reaching conclusions as to the expediency of the reform as a whole.

The growth of the national income over the year 1987 turned out to be about our lowest in postwar years (2.3 per cent). The amount of housing turned over for tenancy last year was 8.3 per cent up on the previous year's figure, an all-time high. Industrial output grew by 3.8 per cent; farm produce output by 0.2 per cent; real per capita incomes, by 2 per cent.

Such growth rates are comparable with those of the recent past. Does this go to show that nothing has changed? On close scrutiny it will turn out that even the figures as such have assumed a new quality: now they are closer to reality, and appear in statistical surveys regardless of whether some "big shots" like them or not. Previously, the way to learn the actual economic situation in the country was to pick up statistical surveys published over a succession of years and to find out which indices had disappeared. A few years ago this happened to statistics pertaining to grain output, child mortality and many other things. Sometimes the units of measurement were changed from items or tons to percentages or rubles, and the year taken as the standard for comparison was pushed further back. This practice was explained away more or less convincingly at times, but anyone in the know could tell at once that if certain statistics no longer appeared in print, or if units of measurement changed, the situation in the fields concerned was critical. Such dubious manipulations are no longer practised. The latest survey by the State Committee for Statistics says, for instance, that the trading network has rejected 7-9 per cent of sewn and knitted goods and shoes. Information like that used to be withheld until recently. It only remains to make the next step and to let the public know what percentage of these articles has been rejected by consumers, i.e., by you and me.

Why didn't previous statistical surveys suit us? On paper, things sometimes looked slightly better, sometimes slightly worse, while life was taking its course. The reader of statistical surveys was like someone using a thermometer or a tonometer to find out his physical condition.

For a long time we went in for intermediate results, took pride in extracting more natural resources than any other country in the world, and tried to ignore the fact that using these resources we obtained an unacceptably meagre end product.

Now this approach seems to have been discarded. in words, at any rate. Have we actually switched to a different method of assessment? To a certain extent, we have. Our statistical surveys have come to include information on the quality of products, the saving of resources, and work force utilization. Nevertheless, alongside with these new developments, we do come across things we've long been used to.

"The proportion of the coal mined by the advanced open-cut method constituted 42.6 per cent of the total," the latest survey by the State Committee for Statistics says. From the viewpoint of the intermediate result, all the more so that obtained in an individual industry, this coal mining technique is doubtlessly the most efficient one. But what about the tracts of fertile land taken up by opencut collieries and spoil dumps and lost to agriculture for a long time to come, if not forever? What about the crops these tracts have not yielded? What about the upsetting of hydrological balance, about the oxygen the chopped down forests have not generated? Doesn't the aggregate damage it has done to society detract from this technique's benefits to the mining industry? Admittedly, opencut mining is efficient, although many experts have serious doubts about that. But how are we, ordinary mortals, to take the reports on the expansion of opencut mining practice? Or the news that our robot population increased by 11,000 last year? Is this figure too high, too low, or just right? After all the evolution of our attitude to robots has zigzagged sharply: at first we all but ignored them,later we came to regard them as a symbol of scientific and technological progress and to enthuse over them out of all proportion to their true economic efficiency, and now we have settled, at last, to a soberly businesslike way of using them. Well, what lies behind a published figure? Doesn't it also include costly robots that perform just one operation, that is replace just one human operator, but need two maintenance men to look after them?

And so, the social and economic results of the past year have been summed up. They reflect our own performance without over- or underrating it. At any rate, they have laid the ground for further development. Our future progress depends on the extent to which we use this new economic mechanism now in its formative period.

On criticism, self-criticism and glasnost

LEONID IONIN

The subject of this article is Lenin and criticism, the Leninist method of criticism. But before getting down to an examination of Lenin's views of criticism, I should like to quote a poet. Of all the huge volume of poetry devoted to Lenin, an excerpt from Boris Pasternak's "A noble obsession" stands out strikingly. It stands out because of its non-epic nature, the unexpected combination of ordinary everyday details with a feeling of the majesty and immensity of history in the making. This combination of the ordinary with the extraordinary, which could have turned any ordinary person's head, was harmoniously combined in Lenin.

His hand lunged out like a fencer's
When he, with arguments galore,
Pursued a point, his jacket open,
His restless feet pacing the floor.
No matter what his subject: petrol,
Or anything, his very stance
Revealed the kernel of the matter,
Stripped of the stupid husks, at once.
.....
When citing facts, he knew for certain
That as his mouth set them free,
They added up to lift the curtain
Upon forthcoming history.
With history he felt at ease
And free from any nervous squirms,
Without taking liberties
The two got on on intimate terms.

One can have different kinds of relationship with history. For instance, from the quiet of one's study one can follow the changing times, linking them with the invisible threads of social, cultural and political continuity. That attitude of remote observation is typical of historians. Politicians come closer to history, feeling the very fabric of developing realities concealed by the rapidly changing events and facts. Politicians are on close terms with history. That was particularly true of Lenin, who could discern the onward movement of history in the simplest facts of life. Hence his "fault-finding" usually known by its less poetic name of criticism.

That criticism is essential and useful is not fully recognized by everyone even today. But if one recalls how uncritically happy the society of the future looked in the works of the socialist Utopians, and the hopes for complete harmony between ideas and actions that inspired millions of working people in the struggle for socialism, then one immediately understands how unprecedentedly new were the problems of criticism that confronted the young Soviet state.

And they had to be resolved as they arose. In 1921, when the Civil War had ended and the victory of the revolution throughout the country was an undisputed fact, the party announced its transition to the New Economic Policy (NEP). It was an unprecedented step, both in its boldness and the difficulties it entailed. Not only a section of the working people, but certain prominent figures in the party regarded the transition to the NEP as a retreat from the positions captured by the revolution, almost as a betrayal of the revolutionary cause. Lenin, however, pointed out that the political and economic situation dictated the need for such a step. Lenin agreed that the classics of Marxism made no mention of the possibility of state capitalism operating when political power was in the hands of the proletariat. But the classics did not go in for predictions. We must learn to act for ourselves, taking into account the given situation, the requirements of the moment. And the most important means of achieving our aims in these circumstances should be merciless criticism and self-criticism. "If this transition (to the NEP - L.I.) calls forth complaints, lamentations, despondency and indignation among some people, we must say that defeat is not as dangerous as the fear to admit it, the fear to draw all the logical conclusions from it.... Our strength lay and will lie in our ability to evaluate the severest defeats in the most dispassionate manner, and to learn from them what must be changed in our activities. That is why we must speak plainly."

This principled position on the need to admit one's mistakes openly and in time, on the importance of a critical discussion of the measures proposed and of learning the lessons of past experience were not formulated on the spur of the moment in 1921. From the outset they were the underlying principles on which the activities of the revolutionary party of the Russian proletariat founded by Lenin were based. They were the principles of party organization, which Lenin was now applying to the organization of the Soviet state.

Lenin never wrote a special theoretical study on criticism. But in many of his works he touches on the subject. From these remarks one can formulate the main principles of Lenin's critical approach to party and state affairs.

The first of these principles is freedom of criticism. "We defined it as," Lenin wrote, "**unity of action, freedom of discussion and criticism.** Only such discipline is worthy of the democratic party of the advanced class." Only democracy makes it possible dialectically to unite "unity of action" and "freedom of discussion and criticism." Lenin strongly opposed both the discipline of blind obedience and the anarchy of endless meetings, and insisted that organization should be democratic. "Organization not based on principle is meaningless...The proletariat does not recognize unity of action without freedom to discuss and criticize." Lenin made that

point in 1906. And it would, of course, be wrong to think that eighty-odd years later those words have lost their full meaning. Both then and now, what they come down to is that discipline and organization in carrying out the decisions adopted make sense only when these decisions have been well thought out and critically discussed, i.e., when they have been adopted democratically. Otherwise, as Lenin put it, those who implement the decisions become mere appendages of those in power.

"Freedom of discussion and criticism" is an extremely important source of our advancement today. Experience has taught us what dire, corruptive and demoralizing consequences for the life of society abandoning these principles can have. "Organization not based on principle" gradually deteriorates into disorganization, and discipline not based on principle turns people into window dressers and indifferent formalists. Equally, we can see the rich potential inherent in principled organization prompted by an active democratic discussion of the aims and ways of advancement.

The second principle is constant self-criticism. There are two kinds of self-criticism. First, the self-criticism of the mistakes and miscalculations of a specific individual, and, second, the self-criticism of an organization or public institution, or society as a whole. Lenin insisted that both forms of self-criticism should be used in the party and in government.

Of the first he wrote: "It is necessary that the party should **always see** every 'defeat', even if partial, of one or other of its 'leaders.' No political leader has a career that is without its defeats, and if we are serious when we talk about influencing the masses, about winning their 'goodwill,' we must strive with all our might not to let these defeats be hushed up...but to have them submitted to the judgement of all. That may appear embarrassing at first sight, it may seem 'offensive' sometimes to individual leaders but we must overcome this false feeling of embarrassment, it is our duty to the party and to the working class."

At the same time, a party organization's self-criticism is important, as are the courage and frankness with which it admits its own mistakes. In 1913, in a letter to Pravda, Lenin insisted that a mistaken view expressed in an article should be put right **in print.** He wrote: "An error rectified is an error no more. Unrectified it becomes a festering sore. In such cases one must have the courage to have it operated on at once." Later in 1917, analyzing the situation, he writes in the article "From a publicist's diary" : "Our party's mistake is obvious. A fighting party...need not fear mistakes. What it should fear is persistence in a mistake, refusal to admit and correct a mistake out of a false sense of shame." This means that the more acute and tense a situation, the greater the cost such a mistake could acquire, the greater the courage needed to admit and rectify it.

Lenin's third principle is the connection between criticism and practical work. "Every critic," Lenin wrote in 1921, "must ...by directly participating in Soviet and party work be able to test the rectification of errors of the party or of individual party members in practice." What is in this case formulated as part of a resolution, Lenin had mentioned almost two decades earlier in a letter to V.A. Noskov: "You once said to me: upbraid the Iskra-ists! And I replied: it is not I but **you** should do so, for only one who takes part practically in the work **itself** and who knows it thoroughly has the right to do so." At about the same time, he

"AN ERROR RECTIFIED IS AN ERROR NO MORE. UNRECTIFIED IT BECOMES A FESTERING SORE."

V. Lenin

expressed his views (in a letter to F.V. Lengnik) of those who send in complaints: "The local 'activist' does not lift a finger to squeeze **good** pamphlets...**to get local writers to contribute to Iskra.** Why do that? It is much easier to complain than to undertake such a troublesome business! And the present-day reader unblushingly calls himself an Iskra-ist on the grounds that he writes complaints to Iskra."

That naturally does not mean that complaints should not be written to a newspaper. Lenin's words imply, first of all, that constructive criticism is desirable (don't **simpiy** complain, but offer advice), secondly, the wish to involve a wide grass-roots circle of activists in party work, and, thirdly, a profoundly Marxist interpretation of criticism as a pactical form of work designed to change existing social and economic relations.

The very emergence of Bolshevism as a political movement was largely the result of this principled attitude to criticism. After the victory of the October revolution, Lenin, applying the principle not to party work but to the work of the state, interpreted the ties between criticism and practical work as designed to draw the working masses as widely as possible into running the state.

Addressing the Moscow Gubernia Conference of the RCP (B) in November 1920, Lenin said: "Genuine construction work means applying criticism which must be constructive."

And finally, the fourth principle - glasnost, and the democratism of criticism. That is essential for any genuine criticism, genuine democracy. Without glasnost there can be no democratic initiative of the masses, or participation by them in government. Lenin reacted very sharply to attempts by some administrators to hush up shortcomings in their work on the grounds that they would otherwise be playing into the hands of the enemies of socialism. On the contrary, he believed that the absence of truth, the absence of glasnost only benefited those who sought to cover up their own bad work. The absence of glasnost not only gives rise to bad management, but also undermines the very principles of a democratic policy. So glasnost is not only an organizational issue, but a political one as well. The people should be kept informed on all problems and difficulties that arise at all levels of government; they must judge everything for themselves and have their own point of view.

"Light, more light!" is Lenin's brief yet expressive formula for glasnost.

* * *

Lenin's words remain as true today as ever. Of course, there was no dearth of quotations, slogans and banners with Lenin's profile in the past either - in previous decades. But the very spirit of Leninism is incompatible with dogmatism.

The fresh wind of change has stirred the public to action. Today, in checking with Lenin, we seek not just to repeat his words, but to think independently and critically. Criticism today should be regarded as the real living cause of socialist construction and a mighty weapon against dogmatism. But this weapon was not always made full use of in the history of the Soviet state in post-Lenin times. As a result, policies fed by dogma and command policies led to economic, political, social and human losses. Lenin's criticism is creative in that it comes out against dogmas.

It is constructive also because it is extremely vital. We have known many slogans about the revolution as criticism of the obsolete, about the proletariat's historic role of sweeping away exploiters and oppressors, and about dialectics as criticism. The need for these general revolutionary formulas has not passed (and probably never will for as long as new generations feel the need to find their place in history, and the purpose of their struggle and labour). But it was far from always possible for a specific individual with his own personal interests and affairs to find for himself in these formulas sufficient food for thought and grounds for practical work. Lenin's principles of criticism teach us to do this. ■

A SENSITIVE ISSUE

VITALY IGNATENKO

"It is better to light a single candle than to curse the utter darkness." With these words the participants in the international conference on human rights, held recently in Holland, were greeted by its initiator, Ernst van Eeghen, a prominent Dutch Christian leader who for many years has enjoyed high esteem in European public life. It was van Eeghen who first advanced the idea of holding an unofficial conference, a dialogue among people of different political and religious persuasions.

The Soviet Union was represented by members of the Commission on international cooperation in humanitarian and human rights issues under the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation. Van Eeghen's invitation to attend the meeting had been accepted by religious, public and scientific personalities, journalists, parliamentarians and legal experts from various countries. From the U.S.A., for instance, there were congressmen, both present and former.

Would this conference, like so many others, not become an occasion for mutual recriminations and propaganda jousting? In his opening address to the first session Alexander Sukharev, Minister of Justice of the R.S.F.S.R., co-chairman of the conference, hopefully observed: "At one time Holland helped Peter I to open a window to Europe for Russia. Might we not here today in Holland start opening the doors of trust at the frontiers between the two worlds?"

The participants from different countries seated themselves at the conference tables, not by delegations but face to face. This had been the procedure on previous occasions too, but constructive dialogue had not ensued, the auditorium had quickly polarized into the West and the rest of the world. Into the righteous and the blameworthy. This time, however, there was a different, new atmosphere. How did this affect the discussion of human rights problems? It will be of interest to hear what the participants had to say. Perhaps the following excerpts from my notebook will convey the spirit of the rather prickly debate that took place in the hospitable De Burght Centre. The statements, comments, remarks and fragments of conversations I have recorded were made by nearly all the participants in the conference. Here are some of them: Fyodor Burlatsky (U.S.S.R.), Rosalynn Carter (U.S.A.), the Rev. Dr Glen Garfield Williams (Britain), Andrei Grachev (U.S.S.R.), Anne-Aymone Giscard d'Estaing (France), Marian Dobrosielski (Poland), Richard John Neuhaus (U.S.A.), Dr Jan Pudlak (Czechoslovakia), Hans Stuckelberger (Switzerland), Nikita Moiseyev (U.S.S.R.), Abner J. Mikva (U.S.A.), Frederick Starr (U.S.A.), Wilgot Fritzon (Sweden), Metropolitan Juvenaly (U.S.S.R.), Chris Smith (U.S.A.), Domenico Rosati (Italy), Patrick Cormack (Britain), Philippe Villers (U.S.A.), Jozsef Halasz (Hungary), Erwin N. Criswold (U.S.A.), Yuri Smirnov (U.S.S.R.), Christian Tomuschat (F.R.G.), Boris Krylov (U.S.S.R.), Frank Wolf (U.S.A.). Perhaps it is not important to specify exactly who voiced one or another idea or thought expressed here. The main thing, in my opinion, was the search for common positions and accord, the opportunity to exchange afforded for judging of the complexity of the subject of the discussion - human rights.

■ This is perhaps the first attempt on the part of the public to tackle the complicated and in many respects knotty question of humanitarian cooperation and human rights. Moreover, to examine it from the standpoint of the new thinking which was strikingly manifest in the results of the summit meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan.

We have gathered here not merely to reiterate our dedication to human rights and to cite national achievements in this sphere. Nor, of course, for mutual sermonizing on this score. Such an approach, and one which regrettably has been only too familiar to us for many years, has never been productive of results. It has objectively fostered suspicion, confrontation. We have been not averse to indulging in downright psychological warfare.

■ Many political leaders, whether we recognize it or not, are captive to concepts that have made human rights a bargaining counter of confrontation.But times are changing. Reading Soviet

and American newspapers which for years have depicted the condition of millions of people as utterly hopeless, Russians and Americans are beginning to wonder: if the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. are inhabited only by mute slaves, who brought these countries to the pinnacle of scientific and technological progress and made them first-class powers?

■ Human rights is an extremely delicate question and, in this age of interdependence, a highly sensitive one. It calls not only for competent, objective study, but also for protection against alien, pernicious encroachment. Hitherto countries have been sorely lacking in both a sense of history and plain common sense. The reality is this: East and West have come to their social values and traditions by different roads. One may not accept these values and traditions but one must learn to understand them.

■ Human rights present an exceptionally difficult problem for international regulation. The very participation in the process of search for agreement and mutually acceptable principles and legal norms in this sphere must be highly evaluated.

■ The internationalization of human rights is a matter of great importance. This problem has been tackled over the past 40 years through the medium of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and numerous other documents on human rights.

And although the United States has not yet ratified international conventions on human rights, a fact which I deeply regret, this does not mean that we reject the principles of these international documents.

The internationalization of human rights would enable us to discuss ways and means of helping to put an end to violations of human rights, and also to study the need for cooperation between East and West on these questions.

■ I believe that we ordinary citizens must insist that the point of department in such discussions, whether on governmental or private level, should be good will and recognition of the fact that no nation or people has a monopoly on good or evil. We all have problems when it comes to human rights.

Another fact to be recognized is that internationalization of human rights would give all of us the right, and indeed the obligation, to speak up when our own or other governments violate the human rights guaranteed on an international plane.

■ International cooperation in ending such violations cannot be facilitated by insulting one another or accusing one another of such violations. Violation of human rights by one government cannot be justified on the grounds that some other government is guilty of such violations.

■ Ours is a very special conference. We must first learn to see the mote in our own eye before we see the beam in someone else's.

■ The concept of universal peace, to my mind, is a concept of justice. It is easy to speak of the lack of justice in other parts of the world. It is difficult to speak of this with regard to one's own country.

■ There is no such thing as justice before or after. There either is justice or there is not.

■ At home in the U.S. I recently read Gorbachev's book about perestroika. What is happening today in the Soviet Union is admirable. Yes, we can learn from each other in a sphere such as human rights. You prod us, we will prod you. And other countries should prod both of us.

■ Prod, but not set one against the other. Which is what frequently happened formerly.

■ I think that it is in our common interest, without renouncing the principles we believe in, to approach humanitarian questions from lofty moral positions. This will help to clear away past accretions. At the same time it is essential to take a sober view of the entire complex of problems which burden the lives and labours of hundreds of millions of people, making them hostage to the dangerous trend of developments in the world - the unpredictable destruction of the environment, the shortcomings in the field of nuclear power engineering, and, the most terrible danger of all, the global risk of nuclear self-annihilation. The outcome of the summit meeting is a victory also for the peace movement. We believe in the vast potential of that movement. We regard this meeting as the first highly promising step towards establishing a permanent dialogue also on such an important issue as securing human rights.

■ Yes, open dialogue is better than silent hostility.

■ At this forum it is risky to admit that one is a conservative. However, I am that. True, I might be called a liberal conservative. In any case for me self-criticism is the highest form of democracy. Why are we not told here about the attitude of the U.S.S.R. to prisoner of conscience Slepak? Or about the Berlin wall? I think we should neither flatter ourselves nor shield others.

■ To separate individual rights from social rights is a hopeless exercise. We in our society have achieved individual rights. That is more than social rights. In the countries of the Eastern bloc people are still confined in Gulags... Therefore it is necessary to draw a distinction between the freedoms we are talking about.

■ When one reads or hears how smugly the West sometimes talks about the observance of human rights in their own countries one cannot escape the conclusion that the situation there is very good but not hopeless. In the first place, we have no grounds to consider the West entitled to regard itself as the supreme judge on human rights issues. An analysis of how international covenants and agreements are observed gives us cause for justified doubts as to whether Western countries, and particularly the U.S., can be considered full-fledged partners in resolving these questions.

■ It is hard to understand, for instance, why the U.S. has not ratified the international Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), the covenants on human rights (1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), and the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973). One would also like to know when the death penalty for minors will be abolished.

People who live in glass houses ought not to throw stones.

■ Why does the American government refuse to abide by the decision of the International Court of Justice with regard to Nicaragua?

■ We are in the process of reconciliation. At the same time not all the problems facing American society are connected with human rights.

Unemployment, the homeless are social problems, they have no bearing on human rights.

■ We know that more than two hundred people in the Soviet Union have been convicted on religious grounds. We have the list. We demand their release. We also hope that for humane

considerations the Soviet government will be prompted to announce an amnesty on the occasion of the 1,000th anniversary of Christianity in Russia.

■ Soviet legislation contains no provision whatsoever for punishment for religious beliefs. Only those are subject to prosecution who violate the laws on religious cults. The West, on the contrary, maintains that the so-called "religious activists" are prosecuted. What is actually in question are persons convicted of breaches of the laws on the separations of the Church from the state and separation of schools from the Church and encroachment on the person and rights of citizens on the pretext of observing religious rites. There are 18 such convictions. All the rest on your list are believers who have been found guilty of breaches of the law under various articles of the Criminal Code.

■ Perestroika, glasnost and democratization have an appeal for the public in the West. Incidentally, we know that there are some very influential forces that continue to exploit the old propaganda stereotypes. In the first place they lack sincerity and a critical approach to their own problems. Such a position causes the Soviet public to have doubts as to the true intentions of our opponents. Objectively that position helps the opponents of our perestroika who hint at the futility of humanitarian cooperation with the West.

■ Glasnost opens new vistas in public life.

■ The best way to perceive changes in others is to change oneself.

We consider it possible to discuss human rights with our partners only on an equal footing, ruling out the right of anyone to issue ultimatums and demands for changes in our way of life, even if our way of life does not suit someone. How to alter the manner of conducting ideological debate, how to avoid ideological differences being carried over into the sphere of interstate relations, and above all prevent them from aggravating that confrontation which in the world of today in the final analysis places the very existence of mankind in jeopardy - this today is the most important thing.

Discussion on the given subject can be productive only if we recognize that our concepts of human rights and how to secure those rights differ. In our opinion, unless social and economic rights are really guaranteed, declarations of individual freedoms assume a purely formal, not to say hypocritical, character.

We consider it a flagrant violation of human rights when millions of able-bodied people are deprived of the right to work, when they have no possibility of giving their children an education in their chosen field, and when a person's health and his very life are made dependent on the size of his pocketbook.

What can we as partners expect when we know that the desire for peace of the majority finds no reflection in government policy?

■ Everyone has the "right" to sleep in the street, but only the homeless exercise it.

■ We do not place social rights in opposition to political and civil rights, nor do we intend to. All these rights must to a maximum degree ensure a decent life for human beings.

We did not fail to notice the bus in the American capital which was sent for the homeless to a subway station in the centre of Washington during Mikhail Gorbachev's stay in the U.S.A.

■ Today, when our society is in a sense returning to the fundamental humanistic values of socialism for which Lenin laid the foundation and which he bequeathed to us, we unquestionably perceive the universal legacy of the great minds of the epochs of Enlightenment and the Great French Revolution in a different light. Lenin's counsel to take everything valuable from bourgeois democracy and to learn not only to coexist but to cooperate has a topical significance for us today. Perestroika is our own choice. It primarily concerns our society. A radical renewal of all aspects of life is under way, but the heart of perestroika, its motive force is the process of democratization, the strengthening of the legal status of the individual, the broadening of the guarantees of rights and freedoms.

The Hague, January

Of course, at times it seemed that there could be a throwback to the old positions. And indeed that might well have happened, regrettable though it would have been. On the whole, though we were not exactly delighted with the conference, we were reasonably satisfied with it.

Surprisingly enough, the final communiqué, adopted after a dignified and not too protracted discussion, satisfied everyone. All without exception felt they had won their points.

We agreed that dissension and recrimination are not productive of results; what is needed is a search for ways to dialogue, an analytical approach, effort to consider the experience of a different social system in the field of humanitarian questions. It turned out that not all that our Western colleagues fail to understand about our life is beyond the bounds of common sense.

It also turned out that not all our fellow conferees are keeping pace with the times. Our revolutionary restructuring of society engenders new approaches, among other things, to the problem of human rights. The West is behind the times: it is clearly suffering from a crisis of ideas.

But, after all, this was the first meeting of its kind.

We set side by side but we did not really talk to one another, Rosalynn Carter remarked. Gorbachev inspires me. World public opinion is on his side. He can do everything now. We must begin meeting regularly. Perhaps twice a year. In Atlanta, perhaps, at the centre my husband Jimmi Carter heads, or in Moscow, or here in Holland.

The discussions will probably not be smoothsailing in future either. What is needed is not only good will and breadth of political vision, but also realization that human rights problems can and must be discussed only on an equal footing.

Renewed impulse towards integration

The meetings of the Permanent Conference of Latin American Political Parties and of leading economic experts held this month in Lima and Caracas, respectively, testify to the intensification of the integration process in Latin America.

The representatives of 32 political parties who gathered in Lima discussed pressing issues of democratization in Latin America and the struggle for social justice and human rights. They condemned the anti-popular regimes in Chile and Paraguay and expressed their support for the struggle of progressives in those countries.

Romulo Escobar Betancourt, chairman of the Permanent Conference and a Panamanian political leader, dwelt on the Nicaraguan issue, noting that Washington's stand is the chief obstacle in the way of carrying out the Guatemalan accords designed to resolve the Central American crisis.

The Permanent Conference was founded in 1979 with the aim of uniting political groups and parties of a nationalist character to oppose "foreign domination on the continent in any form." It has taken a vigorous stand against the dominant position of transnational, for the most part U.S., corporations there, and Washington's militarist plans.

The meeting in Caracas was attended by representatives of the Latin American Economic System, the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the Latin American Integration Association, and the Andean Pact.

The main item on its agenda was Latin America's foreign debt, which runs to 400 billion dollars. The countries of the region now have to transfer over a third of their export earnings to their creditors in the United States and Europe, whereas up to half Argentina's, Brazil's and Mexico's earnings go in interest payments.

As a result, the economic crisis that spread throughout Latin America in the early 1980s is being exacerbated and poverty, inflation and unemployment are on the increase, participants in the meeting pointed out.

Both meetings urged the Latin American governments jointly to search for the most effective ways of solving the region's socio-economic and political problems. For some time, political and public leaders there have been increasingly preoccupied by regional integration. Thanks to this, a renewed impulse is being given to the activity of old regional organizations, such as the Latin American Parliament, and new ones, such as the Group of Rio de Janeiro (which includes member countries of the Contadora process and aims at working out joint economic and political agreements) and the Central American Parliament.

YURI KUDIMOV



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Indivisible heritage

World culture is for everyone

NIKOLAI ANASTASYEV, D.Sc. (Philol.)

Viewing the end of the 20th century as if from a point well advanced in the 21st, Dmitry Likhachov, member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, described it in the following terms:

"It was a century of divisions, isolation, disagreement and intolerance of everything 'alien.' A century of national divisions (characterized by mounting chauvinism), racial, social and continental divisions, division between the First, Second and Third Worlds, between various sciences, between men of science and other intellectuals, between technology and the humanities, between the professions (which resulted in extremely narrow specialization), between world outlook and ideology (which should not be confused). The world plunged into deliberate deafness, though its inhabitants had not yet lost the power of speech. It would be more accurate to say that everyone was muttering to him- or herself alone. I fear that soon we shall lose our ability to speak. What would be the purpose of speaking if nobody at all was listening?"

There is certainly a grain of truth in what he says. For too long people, divided into clans, castes and communities, have been selfishly trying to assert their views and interests instead of jointly searching for the truth. Nobody lent an ear to individuals, even such personalities as Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell. Humanitarian culture alone tried to resist the powerful pressure of centrifugal forces by preserving its natural and beneficent integrity. Regrettably, stereotypes poisoned even the cultural atmosphere. Having decided that Soviet literature is a function of state policy, the West simply barred access to its values. We, for our part, ruled that Western culture was infected with the pernicious germ of bourgeois morality. As a result, over a period of several decades we tried to protect our ideological virginity burying our heads in the sand, because we feared that the virus would invade our country. This policy in the publishing business was accompanied by clever statistical exercises intended to demonstrate a seemingly broad democratic approach. However, no quantitative indices can possibly fill the appalling gaps. In addition, it is strange to apply the same yardstick to art and the football pitch or running track, where you must have a winner. Another important point. The method of selection we cultivated inevitably distorted the reader's idea of literature. Distinguished, though "undesirable," authors have, perhaps, at times been suppressed in favour of figures selected at random.

It appears that the overcautious policies in this field are no longer pursued so relentlessly. I would not say that we have already achieved any astounding results. However, the desire to give a fuller and more balanced idea of 20th-century culture is evident. Irrelevant considerations are being overridden. So, perhaps, Academician Likhachov hopes, the next century will indeed be an age of culture.

This will not come about on its own. No one should cherish any illusions on that score. The slow, difficult, but growing exchange with world culture is not universally acclaimed. Far from it. Certain quarters are crying at the tops of their voices about the danger of a foreign invasion. The treacherous enemy is looking for loopholes in order to span bridges in pursuit of his selfish ends. And we, through sheer folly or with evil intent, are opening our frontiers, publishing works by foreign authors, arranging exhibitions and offering foreign speakers the opportunity to address our people.

But who is the enemy? When young writers, literary and art critics working for the magazine Molodaya Gvardia, attack the craze for rock and other forms of mass culture, I am prepared to side with them. But with one reservation: shouting won't help prove their point. It would be better carefully to examine the reasons why substitutes are being preferred to real culture. But in some incredible way rock and break-dancing are identified in content with modernism and the latter, in turn, is regarded as synonymous with Western art in general.

SHOULD ART BE COMPARED WITH A FOOTBALL PITCH?

In keeping with the set pattern of thought, these authors propose to reject these forms and impose a ban on them. They want "to thwart the efforts of those who wish "to pursue a policy of cultural convergence with the West under the guise of glasnost." They say that this line is unsuitable for our country, that it will only harm us. Cultural pluralism and free competition of different, sometimes divergent, viewpoints, tastes and passions imply the abandonment of the main idea that unites the Soviet people and of their traditional spiritual values, they assert. It will sidetrack the nation from the high road of its history. The theory behind this concept is that "a society enjoying unbounded freedom of speech is unlikely to survive. This would result in the depreciation of the value of the word. It would be particularly unnatural for Russia because, by tradition, our people have great faith in the word."

One can easily see that the campaign is based on the slogans of perestroika and new thinking. It is such a pity that it is young people that are aggressively opposing "us" and "them." One would think that their minds would be free of the inveterate prejudice nourished by lack of knowledge and culture.

There is something else that interferes with our progress to the age of culture, namely, the aesthetic superiority complex which is so difficult to overcome. I disagree with those who, covertly or overtly, try to promulgate the idea that socialist realism as a concept or phenomenon has exhausted itself, that it has become a mere illusion or a symbol of civic loyalty. But the didactic tone is even less appealing. We seem to have brilliantly mastered the art of propaganda. But we have not been so good, and sometimes not at all good, at the art of conducting a dialogue on equal terms. It would be fair to say that William Faulkner or, perhaps, the Latin Americans, could teach our writers a thing or two, and that reading Franz Kafka is enlightening. However, as soon as you say this, you will hear warnings or even angry retorts about our authors having reached or being about to reach these heights. Therefore there is no use looking up to foreign standards. Once Anatoly Bocharov voiced an idea that was hardly sensational. In effect he said that "contemporary (Soviet. - **N.A.**) writers have benefited from the experience of William Faulkner, Thomas Mann, Marcel Proust, Garcia Marquez, Andrejs Upits and Mikhail Kotsyubinsky." No sooner had he uttered this than he was branded a formalist and a dyed-in-the-wool relativist who was seeking to put Soviet writing into the dark shadow of Western literature.

CONDUCTING A DIALOGUE ON EQUAL TERMS DOES NOT COME EASILY

It is too bad that this idea of patriotism, sometimes in a more and sometimes in a less civilized form, has survived to this day. In a recent contribution to the Moskva magazine, Alexander Ovcharenko writes that hardly had Soviet literature appeared than it took up a leading position in the world and that it still retained it. Here again creative work is being likened to an athletic contest, with the winner known in advance. It would be appropriate to recall what Lenin said with reference to developments on a far greater scale. It is hoped that his words will have a sobering effect on some hotheads and cause the snobs to reflect. He wrote:

"It would be absurd to set up our revolution as the ideal for all countries, to imagine that it has made a number of brilliant discoveries and introduced a heap of socialist innovations.... We have acquired practical experience in taking the first steps towards destroying capitalism in a country where specific relations exist between the proletariat and the peasants. Nothing more. If we behave like the frog in the fable and become puffed up with conceit, we shall only make ourselves the laughing-stock of the world; we shall be mere braggarts."

It hurts to think of the grave damage this blustering boasting has done to our relations with Western intellectuals.

On the one hand, we have emotions often seasoned with ignorance pure and simple, and, on the other, mere declarations. Neither can be refuted by rational argument. But here is a more difficult and serious case. An idea intended to divide is being presented as a scientific concept supported by theses and reference to authorities. Naturally, no one stoops to accuse people of kowtowing to the West, or considers it objectionable to be well-versed in world culture. On the contrary, they now say that you must know everything. In his article, Yuri Kagramanov, an eminent cultural sociologist, writes: "One can only welcome the fact that broad sections of the reading public now enjoy access to hitherto unknown works by outstanding foreign authors." Some of the points raised in the article are indisputable. It says that it is bad indiscriminately to consume the specimens of mass culture wholesale. It is just as bad to copy foreign techniques and foreign discoveries. But it is not this that the article is dealing with. As the author himself put it, its intention is to look into simple "everyday" concepts, such as "ours" and "foreign." It appears that the term "foreign" covers not only rock music, but also Marcel Proust, Kabuki Theatre, Fellini and Bergman. Of course, the latter are "foreign" in a different sense. Though they deserve respect and even admiration perhaps, they are nevertheless foreign.

Today, when cultural exchanges are rapidly gaining momentum, Yuri Kagramanov further writes, it is particularly important "to remain aloof from Western cultural processes." Not to shut ourselves up in our own shell as in the past, but "to remain aloof." Why? "In order to assimilate the foreign and not to imitate it blindly. From the outset the foreign should be identified as alien."

I flatly refuse to understand this position or to accept it. But it is not my personal opinion that matters. The main point is that since time immemorial literature has been breaking down barriers of artificial division. It has instinctively resisted all forms of narcissism. Lenin maintained that the values of mankind as a whole take precedence over class and national interests. Real art cannot be divided into "ours" and "theirs." Kagramanov claims that Pushkin, while being responsive to world values, was distinguished by his "capacity to distance himself from the rest of the world." Where did this strange idea come from? Pushkin described Byron as "a ruler of minds." A ruler of one's mind cannot be a stranger.

The wise Blaise Pascal once said: "Speaking of their works, some authors keep on repeating: 'My book, my commentary, my history.' They are like those upstarts who have bought a house and take delight in reiterating: 'My mansion.' It would be better for them to say: 'Our book, our commentary, our history,' because these works contain a lot more from sources other than their own."

We observe similar phenomena in our century. For example, William Faulkner considers himself spiritually closer to the "foreign" Dostoyevsky than to his fellow-countryman Mark Twain. And if you take Thomas Mann, his "own" Goethe and the "foreign" Tolstoy are equally close to him.

Does this mean that William Faulkner, whose roots are in his native land, and Thomas Mann, who is thoroughly German, negate the importance of the national origins of literature? Of course not. They are sufficiently broad-minded and free, sufficiently universal, if you like, to accept things foreign as their own.

We should not learn to remain aloof from literature, but on the contrary, we should acquire the ability to perceive the different and divided as something close and kindred.

As far as critics are concerned, this is not just a professional, but rather a moral and socio-pedagogical task. Their main aim should be to do their utmost to help remove the barriers, to help unite a divided world.

I would like to end this article with two quotations:

"I therefore like to look about me in foreign nations, and advise everyone to do the same. National literature is now rather an unmeaning term; the epoch of world literature is at hand, and everyone must strive to hasten its approach." (Goethe.)

"The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature." (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. "Manifest of the Communist Party.").

This is an old lesson in new thinking that never becomes outdated.

A hard-working river

From the Black Sea to the Alps

From our special correspondent
ALEXANDER USVATOV

When you look from the middle of the Danube towards Bratislava, two historic monuments cannot fail to catch your eye. They belong to different ages: the medieval Bratislava Hrad and the majestic monument on Slavin Hill to the Soviet soldiers who gave their lives in the battle for the liberation of the Slovak capital from the nazis in the spring of 1945.

The Danube enters Czechoslovak territory not far from Bratislava, though a canyon in the Lower Carpathians, and then divides into many branches; at times narrowing, then widening again, it carries its waters to the southern borders of Western Slovakia.

For the previous instalments see our issues Nos. 33, 36, 39, 43, 47, 49, 51 for 1987 and No. 2 for 1988.

The trade gates

The port of Bratislava forms the main river gates, and probably sea gates too, of Czechoslovakia. From and to that port stretch Czechoslovakia's export and import routes, not only to the other Danube countries, but also to countries beyond seas and oceans. It is from Bratislava that Czechoslovakia sends pipes for the Tyumen north, electric cable and heavy machine equipment to the Soviet Union.

The port of Bratislava is now being intensively mechanized and technically reequipped, and its technology is being revised. Wide-gauge travelling cranes are replacing the traditional gantries.

"Their use is more profitable and effective," the director of the port Jozef Seginak told us. "Labour productivity and labour safety have been increased. And they have a greater capacity.... Next we are considering transition to a system of automatic computer control."

Actually the port of Bratislava is not merely being reequipped; over the past five years it has been moving gradually to a new site. Why?

Bratislava has grown and the port found itself completely surrounded. That proved inconvenient both to the population and the port. Many problems arose. The port was allocated a new site, and, as it moves, its old site is being built up by the city for its needs. But in moving the port also increases its capacity. It will eventually handle up to 4 million tons of cargo a year, as against the present three and a quarter million.

On the new site most of the equipment is new. The grey and orange giant travelling cranes are an impressive sight. They are produced by Czechoslovakia itself, as well as Hungary and Yugoslavia. I watched them loading Skoda cars for Bulgaria and rolls of thin sheet steel for



This bridge across the Danube in Bratislava, suspended on a single 85-metre-high pylon, is named to commemorate the Slovak National Uprising.

Yugoslavia. Further on other cranes were lifting containers from the mooring boats.

I was interested in finding out what Bratislava port workers thought of the idea of team work.

The port director's answer was emphatic: "The future belongs to them. It's true, however, that this form of collective responsibility is so far making slow headway. We introduced it on an experimental basis in one section. We hope it will help to improve labour discipline, something we were unable to achieve in the past, because of the system of wage-levelling irrespective of the work done. Two workers have already been dropped for slackness. We want to follow the example of your Izmail and the Bulgarian port of Ruse, and set up comprehensive mechanized teams that would share out their earnings depending on each member's contribution and skills. We realize that it is far from simple, and even for some it will prove hurtful. But our most important objective is to achieve a decisive improvement in the organization of labour."

That this is important becomes obvious when you come up against some of the problems encountered by Bratislava port workers.

Nikolai Pushkarev, who heads the agency of the Soviet Danube Shipping Company in Czechoslovakia, told us that among the many cargoes arriving in Czechoslovakia from the Soviet Union are large quantities of iron ore from Krivoi Rog. Their destination are the two Danube ports of Komarno and Bratislava. "But look over there," he said. "Those barges have been standing unloaded for several days now. Such a loss of time is always bad. But now we feel it particularly acutely. Since 1987 the Ministry of Merchant Marine has gone over to the cost-accounting system. The criteria by which our work is judged have changed: instead of dispatched cargoes, it is now assessed in finished voyages and unloaded cargoes."

Why do ships stand unloaded?

"What hinders our work greatly," explained Jozef Seginak, "is that those responsible for the delivery, loading and unloading of cargoes don't pull together: port authorities, river transport and railway transport. Much time is wasted on getting agreement between the various departments. Each has its own criteria. What we would like to see is responsibility concentrated in one pair of hands. Especially since we've learned about the effectiveness of such a system in Leningrad and Izmail, and in the Bulgarian ports. We hope that in the coming economic reform this system will be adopted here."

Jozef Seginak has been in charge of the port for five years, and has worked there for 27 years. So he is a man of experience, who understands the economic aspects of management and takes bureaucratic obstacles to heart.

"I would like to send several of our economists to the Soviet Union and Bulgaria to work there for a while," he said. "But so far it hasn't been easy to do so: it depends more on personal contacts than the interests of our work. Yet I'm absolutely convinced that our work should rest firmly on an economic basis. For instance, we propose to exchange teams with Izmail for a month or two, work in new conditions and learn from each other.

But so far we haven't got anywhere because of all kinds of legal and financial obstacles. The quicker they are swept aside the better. Only genuine reform and greater mobility will allow us to work more effectively. Yet our aims are the same."

Shipbuilders

The second biggest Czechoslovak port on the Danube after Bratislava is Komarno. At that point a bridge links Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The Hungarian city on the other bank has a very similar name, Komarom. The border is halfway across the bridge. Traffic is fairly heavy on the bridge. People travel in cars, on bicycles and on foot. Quite a number of Hungarians work in Komarno and so cross the bridge twice a day. Equally, some Czechoslovak citizens work in Hungary - for the most part railwaymen and port workers.

But the life of almost five thousand of the thirty-five thousand inhabitants of Komarno is bound up with the shipyards. They do not build boats for the Danube alone. The shipyards are almost a hundred years old, but in recent years they have expanded so greatly that it can be said that an entirely new powerful enterprise has gone up.

Komarno shipbuilders have built many different types of ship in their time. But at present they are concentrating on dry cargo vessels of the river-sea class (like The Amur), dredgers (of The Ufa class), and pushboats for barges.

The shipyards work predominantly for export to the Soviet Union. The Komarno dredgers are used to clear the beds of many Siberian rivers, while the dry-cargo vessels operate from Rostov-on-Don, Dnepropetrovsk, Izmail and Archangelsk. The design of these Amur-class boats has been awarded a gold medal at the Engineering Fair in Brno. Now a new class, The Altai, is being built. The shipyards have enough orders to keep them busy until 1990, and judging from the demand, in the year 2000 there will still be no shortage of orders. So their dream is to increase their production capacities.

I learned of that from the chief of the shipyards technical department, Stefan Janek, who showed me round the shipyards. An expert in his field, he has worked there for a quarter of a century. He was educated in the Soviet Union, graduating from the Gorky Institute of River Transport Engineers. There, in the city of Gorky on the banks of the Volga, he also met a girl who was to become his wife, and brought her back to the Danube.

Boats that have left their building berths stand at anchor near the wharf at various stages of completion , and teams of shipbuilders are completing assembly and equipment.

We went on board of an Amur. It looked almost ready: its hull gleamed with white paint, the wheelhouse was ready, and all that remained was to attach the electric cables to the steering console, and a couple of similar jobs.

"In other words, in a week or two the boat will be leaving." It was not so much a question as a statement.

So Stefan Janek's words came as a complete surprise: "By no means! After assembling everything and carrying out routine operational tests, we have to start dismantling. The top of the wheelhouse has to be removed, as well as the main mast and the aerial."

"What's the idea? To assemble in order to take apart again?"

"It can't be helped. It's because of the height of the Danube bridges."

"All of them?"

"No. The main obstacle is the old bridge in the Yugoslav town of Novi Sad. It's very low - under 12 metres."

The bridge is named after Josip Broz Tito and is considered a memorial. It was destroyed by the nazis during the war, and after the liberation of Yugoslavia it

was the first in the country to be rebuilt. A modern high bridge has since been built at Novi Sad.

On the dredgers it is not only the wheelhouse that has to be removed but also the scoop chain with part of its tower and other equipment. Then, in the Romanian port of Galati or the Soviet port Kiliya, a large team from the Komarno shipyards reinstals the deck superstructures.

Up to 2 or 3 months are lost doing the same job twice, not to mention financial losses. The removal and reassembling of deck structures on the Amur class boats alone costs 130-140 thousand rubles, and on the Ufa boats even more. Multiply those figures by the number of boats built each year, and you get millions wasted.

Of course, one can understand the Yugoslavs' cherishing memorable stages in their liberation struggle. Nevertheless one wonders if the preservation of the old Novi Sad bridge in its present form isn't too costly. Perhaps it should be rebuilt - as a draw-bridge? The international Danube Commission responsible for shipping on the river could probably come to some mutually acceptable agreement with the Yugoslav government that would eliminate such a waste of labour and money.

The Danube changes course

The name of the essentially ordinary village of Gabcikovo is now known throughout Czechoslovakia. It lies about halfway between Bratislava and Komarno and is now the site of the biggest ever hydrotechnical construction project in the country's history.

That part of the Danube, as any captain who has sailed the river will tell you, can give anyone nightmares. Strong currents, changing depths, shallows and, most important of all, the level of the river waters can change abruptly. The tides can be compared with sea tides, only they are less predictable. At times, when the level of the water drops, all traffic has to be stopped. I was told of cases when one could cross the Danube on foot near Bratislava, and of other times when the waters rose so high that caravans could not pass under the bridges. Slovakia will never forget the 1965 floods, when almost the entire Danube lowlands lay under water.

It was a tempting dream to make use of this energy and at the same time facilitate shipping and save the adjoining areas from floods.

The idea originated at the beginning of the fifties in both Czechoslovakia and Hungary - for the Danube serves as their common border for 142 kilometres. The project to change the Danube's course was studied at length, exhaustively and cautiously. There were a number of different versions. Only in the mid-seventies was a final project worked out and agreed on. It envisaged the construction of a series of hydrostations in Gabcikovo and Nagymaros (Hungary). In September 1977, the heads of government of Czechoslovakia and Hungary signed an agreement. It was decided that construction expenses and the fruits of the project - electricity and water for irrigation - would be shared equally. But each country would carry out the construction work on its side of the river independently - Czechoslovakia on the left bank, and Hungary on the right.

Czechoslovakia got down to work in 1979, rather slowly. Hungary started later.

The project, of course, received the approval of the Danube Commission. But afterwards critical voices were heard and doubts raised as to whether all contingencies had been taken into account. And not so much from the technical point of view, but from the ecological viewpoint - what consequences were to be expected? For concern for the environment is felt increasingly among the public. So the scientists sat down again to review and analyze all possible aspects of the resulting ecological situation. Everything was checked and double-checked. Another thousand million Czechoslovak crowns were added to the construction allocation of 16 thousand million to take care of environment protection and ensure that the ecological balance of adjacent regions would be unaffected.

Together with journalists from the Slovak paper Praca, we visited Gabcikovo. It was impossible to get a full picture of the construction site, spreading as it did over an area of several dozen square kilometres. But the energetic engineer Juraj Eisel, who acted as our guide, did his best to show us as much as possible. What we missed, he described.

Higher up the river from Gabcikovo, a reservoir is being built, with the water coming chiefly from the Danube's tributaries. From the reservoir, a 25-kilometre bypass navigable channel begins. So far it is dry, and one can see its bed and the high reinforced-concrete banks. Millions of cubic feet of earth had to be moved to build it. A dam with a power station will cross the canal. One can already glimpse the concrete dam site with flap sites for the turbines. There will be eight in all, with a capacity of 90,000 kilowatts each, making a total capacity of 720 thousand kilowatts. Work on installing the first one is to begin this year, and the rest will be put in place over a period of 5 years. There are also two locks for shipping to and from the Danube, which will be deepened. It will then be possible to regulate the level of the water in the Danube and maintain it at optimal level for shipping. (Another dam, lower down the river, will be on the Danube itself, near the Hungarian town of Nagymaros. Its power station will have a generating capacity of 158 thousand kilowatts.)



One more vessel is being laid at the Komarno yard.

Construction work on the Czechoslovak side is in full swing. There are many machines to do the job, and over 4,000 workers to operate them. This includes big groups of Poles and Yugoslavs. They live in five-storey comfortable hostels (2-3 people to a room). Part of the work force comes from nearby villages. And Bratislava is only an hour's bus ride away.

The builders' quarters can't properly be described as a settlement, as it consists of one building: eight five-storey hostels radiating star-wise from the central building to which they are joined. This is the community centre which houses everything a person needs in his leisure time: canteen and cinema, hairdressers and sauna, café and a restaurant serving evening meals at very moderate prices, shops, TV lounges - two, because one is tuned to Slovak programmes and the other to Budapest (quite a number of Hungarians live in Slovakia). Everything has been taken care of and done with taste. The Czechs actually began the job on the project with accommodation and living facilities already there. (We wish construction projects in the Soviet Union were also started that way!)

It is planned to let the water of the Danube flow into the hydropower system on the Czechoslovak side of the river at the end of 1989. Then boats plying the Danube will travel part of the way along a man-made channel.

* * *

The workingman and the river need each other. And to continue to reap the fruits of the river's labour all the countries on its littoral should take care of the river, look after it and help it, individually and together.

Bratislava-Komarno-Gabcikovo-Moscow

Immediately after the war, the U.S. drew up plans for an atomic strike at the Soviet Union. These plans never materialized. Why?

What the generals feared

SERGEI KARAGANOV, Cand. Sc. (Hist.)

During the period when the U.S. still had a monopoly on atomic weapons, the Pentagon elaborated more than 15 plans to bomb and subsequently occupy the Soviet Union. Schemes to annihilate the U.S.S.R. were hatched one after another on the orders of the political leadership. Codenames for projected operations between 1947 and 1949 included: Totality, Pincher, Broiler, Intermezzo, Gunpowder, Doublestar, ABC 101, Dualism, Fleetwood, Bushwacker, Frolic, Offtackle, Charioteer, Halfmoon, Trojan, Dropshot and others.

The only restraint on the imagination of the military who drew up the plans was the number of bombs at their disposal: at the time the Soviet Union possessed no atomic weapons, so they felt it was perfectly safe to schedule an attack for, say, 1952, 1955 or 1957 by which time more bombs would be available.

Politicians also considered attacking and occupying the Soviet Union. In 1948 the National Security Council - the United States' supreme military and political authority - issued Directives 20/1 and 20/4, which outlined, in all seriousness, how to smash and overrun our country, "de-communize" it and form a "new ruling group" for it.

Washington continued to give house-room to the idea of thermonuclear aggression well into the fifties. During the Korean and Vietnam crises and the bitter dispute over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, civilian advisers to President Eisenhower as well as the military recommended the use of nuclear weapons on **eight occasions**: **six times** against the P.R.C. and Vietnam, and **twice** against the U.S.S.R. Judging from his diaries, the President himself considered attacking the U.S.S.R. before it had built up a powerful nuclear potential.

Why didn't they strike? "The United States' commitment to peace," is Washington's standard answer. The implication is that the U.S. bid for military superiority is perfectly innocuous as long as it does not lead directly to war.

We shall try to provide a more truthful answer. Declassified documents going back to the period of the first twenty years after the war do not provide a valid answer for today: the documents are incomplete, and times change. Nevertheless, they give food for thought; neither America's stance, nor its social system has changed. Although American statesmen today are not quite what their predecessors were politically and psychologically, Washington has not appreciably modified its basic concepts since then. However, the world **has** changed, which makes an analysis of the past all the more useful.

General Harmon's view

To begin with, we must ascertain how Washington assessed its potential enemy - a point of no mean importance. An aggressor is believed always to inderestimate his victims, the nazi aggression against the Soviet Union being a classic case in point: both Hitler and his general staff expected the Soviet state to collapse within two to three months. Soviet Americanologists (experts on social and political affairs in particular) have often drawn parallels between U.S. postwar military planning and nazi Germany's underrating of the Soviet potential. Their chief argument is that the U.S. has misjudged the Soviet capacity for developing atomic counterweapons. Though substantial, this argument has proved not to be the decisive one.

In October 1948, U.S. Secretary of Defence James Forrestal made the following entry in his diary:

> **"War planning - so-called strategic plans - are largely an intellectual exercise in which the planners make the best estimate of the form of a war against possible enemies. But the actions of any enemy must, necessarily, profoundly affect any war planning."**

Indeed, the enemy is a factor to be taken into account. In 1949, when strategists drew up the most extensive ever contingency plan for use in the event of a war with the U.S.S.R. (Plan Dropshot), the Department of Defence and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) ordered "evaluation of effect on Soviet war effort resulting from the strategic air offensive." On May 11, the committee, which comprised top-ranking officers and was headed by Air Force Lieutenant General H.R. Harmon, issued a report which came as a shock to the administration. President Truman

> **"was noticeably surprised and disturbed by the report's pessimistic tone."**

The Harmon committee had reached the conclusion that the atomic bombardment plan was impracticable, for all its ferocity (the attack would have killed 2.7 million and gravely wounded four million, without mentioning the victims of radioactive fallout, residual radioactive contamination

of the locality, etc.) Moreover, Harmon regarded the attack as jeopardizing U.S. interests. Why?

The authors of the Harmon committee's report pointed out that the U.S. did not have enough atomic bombs to bring about the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the disintegration of its political system. The report said, in so many words:

> **"The atomic offensive would not, per se, bring about capitulation, destroy the roots of communism or critically weaken the power of Soviet leadership to dominate the people."**

The report pointed out that, far from precipitating a psychological crisis and social collapse, the atomic offensive would rally the Soviet people around their leadership and rouse them to stubborn resistance. It said:

> **"For the majority of Soviet people, atomic bombing would validate Soviet propaganda against foreign powers, stimulate resentment against the United States, unify these people and increase their will to fight."**

As we see, the miscalculations of the nazi occupiers were not lost on the U.S. military. The former had also hoped that their attack on the U.S.S.R. would undermine the unity of the Soviet people.

Besides warning that the Soviet nation would undoubtedly present a united front to the aggressor (as it had done to the nazis), the Harmon committee pointed to the might of the Soviet armed forces and to the insufficiency of the nuclear potential then at its disposal for the total destruction of the U.S.S.R. (in 1948 the U.S. had only thirty-two B-29 long-range bombers modified to carry atomic weapons, and fifty bombs, not all of which could be used). The analysts had their doubts as to the bombers' ability to deliver the bombs to targets and admitted to inadequacy of information about these targets (the fliers would have had to use World War I maps to pilot their planes).

The authors of the report were apprehensive about the situation that might arise in Western Europe following an American attack on the U.S.S.R.

> **"The capability of Soviet armed forces to advance rapidly into selected areas of Western Europe, the Middle East and Far East would not be seriously impaired."**

This conclusion, along with the general deduction that the U.S. was in no position to smash the U.S.S.R., was included in Directive NSC-68, the basic U.S. foreign policy directive from the days of the cold war, issued in 1950. That did not mean, however, that the U.S. had abandoned the concept of a first strike. Early in 1952,

Harry Truman and James Forrestal.



President Truman seriously considered (as evidenced by his unpublished diary) blockading all the Far Eastern ports and delivering a 10-day ultimatum to the U.S.S.R. demanding that we stop giving military aid to friendly forces. The Soviet Union's refusal to comply, Truman reasoned, would result in a total war, i.e., in attacks on Soviet cities. General Omar Bradley later recalled that the plan had been discussed but never acted upon, chiefly because it left the U.S. unprepared for a war in the European theatre, and could have meant losing Europe.

In other words, the American military and politicians were compelled to proceed from the fact that, as a victim of an atomic attack and as the state which had played the key role in routing nazism, the Soviet Union would have extensive support in Western Europe.

Theatre of the absurd

And now we come to what can only be described as the "political theatre of the absurd." At no stage of its postwar policy did the Soviet Union plan to "annex" Western Europe. Judging from documentary evidence, however, Washington dreaded the prospect of Western Europe, with its strong left-wing parties and its desire for independence in world politics, becoming either a non-aligned "third force," or an ally of the Soviet Union. Washington hated the idea of losing the footholds it had gained after the war, and finding itself in political isolation, on the periphery of world politics, where it had languished, for the most part, between the wars.

These apprehensions were voiced frankly in a document released by the State Department's Policy Planning Staff in the first half of 1952. The authors of the document warned the American leadership:

> **"In circumstances in which, in the event of war, the Soviet Union could draw, after the initial phase [The atomic bombing of its territory and the Soviet counteroffensive in Western Europe and the Far East - S.K.] on the resources of Eurasia while we were confined to the Western Hemisphere.... In this way they would gain a potential vastly superior to our own in all material factors and set the stage for the final phases of the struggle for preponderant power."**

What had been intended as a scheme to encircle and crush the U.S.S.R. and establish undivided American hegemony, suddenly appeared as a scheme for the establishment of "Soviet hegemony"! Obsessed with the idea of establishing a new "pax Americana," and with near-

pathological suspicion of the Soviet Union, American politicians and strategists proceeded on the quite wrong assumption that the other side likewise coveted the world.

The Washington politicians made two mistakes. Firstly, they projected their own intentions onto the other side, and judged us by their own standards. Secondly, American geopoliticians gave the most pessimistic estimates of their adversary's forces, in line with the traditions of militarist thinking, in order to alarm the West Europeans and frighten their own Congressmen into allocating additional funds for their needs. As a result, the American intelligence services somehow failed to notice the scale of postwar demobilization in the Soviet Union. After the war, the U.S.S.R. armed forces were reduced by 8.5 million, and in 1948 their numerical strength constituted no more than 2.9 million. The U.S. estimated the figure at no less than five million!

This turned out to be a blessing in disguise. Paradoxically, the exaggeration of the Soviet military potential and the ascription to the U.S.S.R. of aggressive intentions analogous to the United States' own played a positive role. Fear of the Soviet troops' counteroffensive on Europe undermined the position of the hawks in Washington. On the other hand, the Soviet retaliation capability, albeit not yet nuclear, gradually promoted realism in American military and political thinking. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State in the Truman administration, quoted some military as saying that if the Soviet Army mounted an offensive, even the atomic bomb would not stop it, and added that this circumstance was causing considerable concern.

However, Washington dreaded more than just a potential counteroffensive by the Soviet armed forces which would threaten America with world isolation.

New documents

The United States is commonly believed to have lost its strategic invulnerability only towards the end of the fifties, after the Soviet Union developed and deployed its first intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic bombers. Objectively, that was indeed the case, but objectivity and correctness do not necessarily coincide. The documents now declassified show that in Washington's own eyes the U.S. had lost its strategic invulnerability much earlier than that. Since 1949-50, the U.S. military-political leadership was proceeding, to an ever greater extent, from the premise that if war broke out the U.S.S.R. would be able, in retaliation, to deliver some bombs to American cities and subsequently to increase this number to tens and even hundreds.

Directive NSC-68, issued as early as April 14, 1950, warned that the U.S.S.R. might try to strike a retaliatory blow not only at U.S. allies and bases, but also at certain targets on U.S. territory proper. The directive said that if war started in 1950, the U.S.S.R. would be able

> **"to attack selected targets with atomic weapons, now including the likelihood of such attacks against targets in Alaska, Canada and the United States."**

Alternatively, the U.S.S.R. could use its first atomic bombs to

> **"deny the United Kingdom as an effective base of operations for allied forces... to prevent any allied 'Normandy'-type amphibious operations (of the U.S. armed forces. - S.K.) intended to force a re-entry into the continent of Europe."**

At the Pentagon's estimate, the Soviet Union possessed 10 to 20 bombs in 1950. By the end of 1951, the estimate rose to 30, and in 1952 to 50.

The documents quoted below may have exaggerated Soviet capabilities, and the American military and politicians may again have been misled (and not for the last time) by their tendency to overrate their adversary's military potential. What

The first Pentagon document mentioning atom-bombing Soviet cities is dated December 3, 1945.



matters to us, however, is not the actual Soviet capacity for atomic retaliation, but U.S. perception of it.

Document No. 1: "National Intelligence Estimate-65." Prepared by the CIA and other intelligence bodies, it was circulated to top-ranking military and policy makers in June 1953. Subhead: "Soviet Bloc Capabilities Through 1957." The document said:

> **"The U.S.S.R. now has the capability to undertake concurrent air operations against the United States, continental Europe,... Japan and offshore island chain of Asia."**

Soviet bombers were believed to be able

> **"to reach all parts of the United States and to attempt the delivery of a full stockpile of weapons."**

A few months later - in October 1953 - the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Pentagon issued another document for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Devoted to "Magnitude and Imminence" of Soviet threat to the U.S., the document dwelt at still greater length on the likelihood of a Soviet retaliatory strike at U.S. territory.

At the JIC's estimate, the U.S.S.R. had about 1,000 Tu-4 medium bombers with an estimated range of 1,700 nautical miles (3,148 km). That was not enough for a "round trip" to American territory. However, the U.S. did not rule out the probability of the U.S.S.R. sending the bombers on one-way missions if absolutely necessary. Those in the Pentagon obviously remembered the Soviet Army's heroic war record and presumed that Soviet airmen would be ready to avenge the destruction of millions of their countrymen at the cost of their own lives, if need be. Soviet atomic potential appeared substantial to the Pentagon, whose estimate of it ranged from 80 to 240 bombs and averaged 120.

Consequently, Washington regarded the U.S.S.R. as capable of a crushing retaliation against the U.S. - an appalling prospect. At the end of 1952, the State Department's Policy Planning Staff pointed out in a report that it was an "overriding requirement" "to achieve the greatest possible improvement of our position in the conflict" at a cost that would "be less than the destruction of the elements of our own civilization." Simply speaking, the U.S. was supposed to remain more or less invulnerable, and emerge virtually intact from the conflict. This "overriding requirement" was, however, clearly unrealistic.

It should be borne in mind that throughout those years the U.S. heavily outnumbered us in bombers capable of reaching Soviet territory, atomic and nuclear bombs and shells, and tactical missile warheads.

(To be continued)

Tereza never tires...

"When I see Dubrovnik, when I touch its walls, I feel so happy to have been born here, of all places," Tereza Kesovija, a variety star of European renown, sings - and means it. She is in love with her native town.

G.B. Shaw described Dubrovnik as "a paradise on earth." The gem of the Adriatic is encircled by high stone walls within which there lurks a fairy world of medieval palaces, castles and white two-storey houses with red tiled roofs. At high tide, the waves break against the city walls, and the roar of the surf is all-pervading. Tereza's songs, the famous Adriatic tunes which she performs in an incomparable style all her own, breathe the romance and melancholy of Dubrovnik.

When she was a young girl, her father gave her a flute; he had to sell his only pig to raise the price of the gift. Five years later, the girl was admitted to the choir of an old cathedral. Still later she qualified for the Zagreb orchestra....

In the early sixties, Tereza was named "talent of the year." She made triumphant concert tours of Yugoslavia and other countries. At the Paris Olympia she performed numbers from Chaplin films and the screen version of Doctor Zhivago and, of course, songs imbued with nostalgia for old Dubrovnik...

The sixties saw the peak of her popularity. Again and again she came first in the Split Festival. The song "My Good Old Dad" was taken up by the whole world. Tereza sang in Turkey, the U.S.S.R., Canada, the United States, Sweden, New Zealand, and Australia. She competed for the Golden Orpheus award in Bulgaria and took part in the Sopot Festival in Poland. In Monaco, Tereza won the Eurovision song contest.... In 1969, she went to Czechoslovakia for her first Bratislava Lyre festival. In 1977 we saw her at the Intertalante, Prague.

Recently, the Czechoslovak capital welcomed Tereza again. Only this time she was no longer a girl with a flute but a "star" who captured the audience with her temperament, her extraordinary teamwork with the orchestra and her top-class professionalism. Incidentally, in a French TV poll, Tereza beat Juliette Greco for the top popularity vote....

Tereza granted a brief interview to me before a concert.

"What do singing and the stage mean to you?"

"It's my world. I just couldn't live without singing. I feel elated when I sing. If I don't sing, I'm blind and deaf to everything. Sometimes it seems to me that I'm singing for my own pleasure - and then suddenly I hear the applause."

"Stars are usually asked what they think of fame...."

"Fame isn't all joy.... As a saying goes, a small cloud can eclipse many glittering stars. I mean envy. Some people just can't stand someone else being a success. We should feel sorry for them: being envious of others is unlikely to make one happy.

"For myself, I simply can't understand why people are often so cruel to each other, why they kill and destroy, why they waste millions on weapons. This goes against my grain. I want to bring people joy, and make them smile even when I feel like crying myself. Doing this means more than fame to me.

"Jean-Michel Boris, the director of the Olympia, who went to see your concert in Yugoslavia, says he was surprised to find you backstage as fresh and vigorous as ever after about six hours' non-stop dancing and flute-playing. He added that the only other person he knew with such stamina was Gilbert Becaud.

"'Tereza never tires.' I've heard this phrase no end of times, even from my impresario! I do get tired, of course, but whatever I do I enjoy doing...."

"At the Split Festivals in Yugoslavia, you steal the show almost yearly. Last year your prize-winning song was 'My Last and First Love.' How many awards did that make?"

"It was probably the last.... I'm nearing the end of the period when winning is a foregone conclusion. I've got to make way for the young, give them a hope of success. From now on I'll give more of my time to recording and concert tours. My solo concert at the Olympia, Paris, is scheduled for April 18, 1988. And of course I'm going to see more of my son and my husband....

There was only half an hour to go before her concert, and Tereza was no longer with me.

"I must live up to the expectations of my friends and fans...."

She walked out onto the stage, her head bent, and a silver flute in her hands. The audience did not know yet that besides French and Serbo-Croatian songs she would also perform the little flute concerto from Verdi's Nabucco.

PETER KUBINYI
Bratislava

t and Revolution"

This is the name given to the exhibition of paintings, sculpture and drawings of the 1920s in one of the halls of the State Tretyakov Gallery. It would be hard to find a more exact description. For this is the art that was born of the revolution, and drawn into its ranks, the art that documented it for history. Without its many-faceted, colourful and truthful illustrations, the history of the revolution would have remained little more than a terse chronicle of events in black and white newsreels.

The October events revolutionized not only the content of the arts, but their form as well. "Even that work of art, which was most revolutionary in its conception, could prove a blank shot if its shell was old," wrote the well-known Soviet art critic Yakov Tugendhold.

In the grim days of the civil war, the blockade, hunger and ruin, a variety of artistic styles and trends flourished, and many new groups were formed. There were the cubists, the futurists, the suprematists, the constructivists, the lucists and abstract painters. And on the wave of the new revolutionary enthusiasm they produced a new art. The artists worked with passion, held meetings at which they argued heatedly, put forward majestic projects, were carried away by fantastic ideas, and wrote pamphlets and slogans. Pathos and a high-flown style were in fashion.





Vera Mukhina. The Flame of the Revolution. A concept of a monument to Yakov Sverdlov. 1922-1923.
David Shterenberg. A still life. 1919.
Marc Chagall. Peace to Huts, War on Palaces... 1918-1919.

They thrived on the atmosphere and sensed their involvement not only in creating a new culture, but in building a new world. It was not for nothing that Pavel Filonov called one his 1619 paintings, a symbol of international brotherhood,—"Ships bound for the golden age."

The powerful sculptures by Vera Mukhina—"The Wind" and "The Flame of the Revolution"—her concept of a monument to Yakov Sverdlov—have a poetic tinge; the still lifes by David Shterenberg, Alexander Osmerkin and Vasily Shukhayev depicting the meagre rations of those days—bread, herrings and onions—are, though economical, extremely expressive, as are the urbanism and industrialism of the canvasses by Alexander Deyneka, Alexander Labas, and Peter Willyams, which reflect the cult of science and technology that flourished at the time. Of all these works taken together, one can say that they represented "a fiery alloy of realism and romanticism, of everyday life and heroic deeds."

Andrei GRACHEV

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